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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with dispelling the contention that the 
proposed diplomatic mission to the Panama Congress of 1826 was rendered 
useless because of partisan political battles. The major objective of 
this work is to show that questions concerning the constitutionality of 
the proposed mission, the possible effects of the mission on domestic 
slavery, and the potential damage to American neutrality were the 
primary cause of that opposition. This study will show that opposition 
to the Panama Congress was based on these three serious objections, not 
just on the residual feud arising from the presidential election of 
1824. The political feud served only to act as a rallying point for 
diverse segments of an opposition that would have formed in any case. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his major adviser, 
Dr. Michael M. Smith. Dr. Smith's patience and guidance were of 
inestimable value in aiding the completion of this study. Appreciation 
is also expressed to the other committee members, Dr. Joseph A. Stout 
and Dr. Odie B. Faulk, for their invaluable assistance in the prepara-
tion of the final manuscript. 
A note of thanks is given to Dr. H. J. Henderson and Dr. Bernard 
Eissenstat for their advice and understanding during the completion of 
this work. 
Finally, a special note of gratitude must be given to my wife, 
Patricia. During completion of this study, she served as typist, 
research assistant, adviser, and friend. 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
On June 22, 1826, the long awaited and much heralded Congress of 
American Plenipotentiaries convened at the City of Panama. The assembly 
met for ten official sessions spread over twenty-three days and 
adjourned on July 15 of the same year. Adjournment was to be temporary. 
While half of the delegates returned to their home countries to promote 
ratification of the agreements that had been reached at Panama, the rest 
traveled to Tacubaya, Mexico, where, after ratification of the agree-
ments, the assembly was to reconvene. 
The facts that the Panama Congress failed to achieve many of the 
glorious visions of its originator, Simon Bolivar, or that it failed to 
reconvene at all, were not matters of importance to this study. What 
will be examined is the United States• attitude towards the Panama 
Congress, as reflected in the executive and legislative branches of its 
government and how each viewed United States participation in the 
conference. 
President John Q. Adams• administration was generally thought to 
be overshadowed by the 1824 election controversy and the party battles 
and partisan opposition pointing towards the Presidential Election of 
1828. 1 This study will demonstrate that, at least on the Panama 
Congress question, the opposition was more than merely partisan. 
Through the use of documents and diaries, this study will display the 
1 
opposition to the sending of Ministers Plenipotentiary to the Panama 
Congress as based on much more substantial ground than political 
quarrels. There was, of course, the political feuding of the opposing 
factions. Just as important, however, were the questions raised over 
slavery, foreign policy considerations, and the constitutionality of 
the proposed mission to Panama. 2 
Before examining the confrontation between the legislative and 
2 
executive branches over the Panama Mission, an understanding of the 
events leading to the conference is necessary. Questions such as why 
the conference was called, whose idea it was, and what its major objec-
tives were, require examination and resolution. With these preliminary 
questions answered, it will then be possible to view the opposing 
factions and their arguments in the proper perspective. 
The international situation surrounding the call for the Panama 
Congress also deserves attention. The early part of the 1800's was a 
peculiarly chaotic time for the world. The United States, still a 
fledgling nation seeking to unite its several states, was divided 
internally over interpretation of its new constitution. With internal 
political and social problems, the country had little time to devote to 
foreign affairs. It preferred instead, to adopt a policy of self-
interested neutrality, striving to avoid entangling alliances. The 
United States had participated in one war with Europe during this period, 
but only as a result of what we determined to be a violation of our 
neutral rights. For the most part, however, the United States remained 
aloof from Europe and its alliances, limiting its entry into inter-
national relations to tacitly supporting the Latin American revolutions 
and keeping a wary eye on the ownership of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
3 
The United States made no precipitous move to join or support the 
infant republics of South America in their war with Spain. The Latin 
American nations were the first to initiate diplomatic contact between 
the two continents. During the early stages of the Spanish American 
wars for independence, the new nations actively sought United States 
assistance. In 1810, Venezuela, initiated negotiations for a commercial 
treaty with the United States. In 1811, she sought United States recog-
nition of her independence. Later in the decade La Plata and Gran 
Colombia made similar overtures. 3 The United States, however, was not 
anxious to commence formal relations. 
In 1815, President James Monroe officially declared the United 
States neutral in the conflict between the Latin American nations and 
Spain. Monroe's declaration was consistent with the precedent set by 
George Washington in 1793. Monroe strengthened his neutrality act in 
1816 and again in 1818 by providing for harsher penalities for the 
violation of United States neutrality and forbade American citiz~ns to 
participate in a conflict against a power still friendly with the United 
States. 4 Monroe had made the United States position clear. The United 
States wanted to investigate further before it committed itself on the 
question of Latin American independence. While the United States was 
conducting this investigation, it would remain neutral and avoid any 
commitment. 5 
Europe, until 1815, was occupied in conquering the Napoleonic 
menace. Europe spent twenty-five years, from 1790-1815, trying to curb 
the excesses that sprang from the French Revolution. In that quarter 
of a century, Europe, convulsed by war and social ferment, witnessed 
the fall of many of the old regimes. The Napoleonic wind from France 
4 
swept away thrones and empires. The church' and nobles lost much of 
their land and commoners rose to the top administrative and military 
positions. Europe and its old regime had been thrust into international 
cooperation for survival. To quell Napoleon and his revolution, which 
spawned the revolts in Spanish America as well as the turmoil in 
Europe, The Great Powers of Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia 
formed the Quadruple Alliance. The allied coalition was continued after 
Napoleon's final defeat. 
After Napolean 1 s final downfall, the Congress of Vienna marked the 
return of kings and the restoration of the old regime in Europe. The 
allies stayed together to maintain the peace and safeguard the restora-
tive Vienna settlement. The Quadruple Alliance was later supplanted 
by the Holy Alliance, a rather mystical creation of the Czar of Russia. 
Together the grand schemes formed a reactionary force in Europe. By 
1818, France had joined this union, but Great Britain, cautious of 
permanent alliances, withdrew to a position of diplomatic isolation. 6 
The Holy Alliance became the champion of the status quo and 
legitimacy. As such it threatened the Spanish American movements for 
independence which had been spawned by the Napoleonic upheaval in 
Europe. By 1815 and the end of the Napoleonic reign, the wars in 
Spanish America were still in progress, though Spain was impotent and 
retreating from its colonies. The European states of Austria, Russia, 
and Prussia, acting under the Troppac Protocol of 1820, pledged them-
selves to armed intervention in any state where rebellion threatened 
the peace and security of any other states. 
In 1823 France restored Ferdinand VII of Spain to full autocratic 
rule under the Protocol, after crushing a liberal revolt. The revolt 
sprang from mutinying Spanish troops destined for Latin America in 
1820.7 Ferdinand then asked the Holy Alliance to help him reestablish 
control in his Central and South American dominions. The European 
allies enthusiastically accepted. The unwillingness of Great Britain 
5 
to cooperate,however, checked their zeal. Britain was alarmed at the 
reactionary ardor these nations displayed on the continent and protested 
their excesses. The European states were supreme on the continent and 
could ignore England and its protests. The thought of sending a sea-
borne invasion fleet in direct contradiction of British policy and the 
English navy, however, was considered infeasable. Britain had developed 
a profitable trad.e with the new American republics and was loath to lose 
' it. England WO\Jld not tolerate the restoration of the Spanish monarchy 
and its monopolistic system of trade in:those areas. 8 
The Spanish Americans, however, were not certain that all threats 
to their liberty had been permanently alleviated by 1826. There were 
frequent scares throughout the early 1820 1 s. Bolivar believed that all 
of Europe, with- the exception of Great Britain, opposed Spanish American 
independence. He believed the only possible allies South America had 
were Britain and the United States. 9 
On March 11, 1825, B.olivar wrote Francisco de Paula Santander, Vice 
President of Colombia, about his fear concerning an invasion of 
Venezuela by a French naval squadron, then in the Caribbean. For this 
,. 
reason, Bolivar wanted to curry favor with both Britain and the United 
,. 
States. Bolivar believed that thes~ nations would protect South 
American convoys in case of war with France. 10 In the late spring, 
,. 
Bolivar again expressed his fear of European intervention to Santander. 
He stated that if the Holy Alliance meddled in South American affairs, 
the Latin American nations must unite. By cooperating, Latin America 
could protect all points under or threatened by attack. The need to 
develope this cooperation made the creation of the Panama Congress an 
urgent matter. 11 
Thus amid fears for Spanish American survival arising from the 
.. 
threats of reactionary Europe Bolivar conceived the idea of a Panama 
.. 
6 
Congress. Bolivar believed he needed the protection of Britain and her 
navy even at the ultimate expense of closer ties with the United States. 
European turmoil and reaction threatened Latin American independence . 
.. 
Bolivar created the Panama Congress to form an international political 
alliance to preserve that independence. 12 
By 1824 Latin America itself was highly unstable. The years of 
war and the dearth of political experience were chaotic elements in the 
confused internal affairs of the independent republics. Military 
chieftians, known as caudillos emerged to take advantage of the disrupt-
ed society and provincialism of the people. Rivalry for control of the 
n~w governments threatened anarchy, civil war, and eventual reconquest 
by some European power. In 1824-1825, a civil war erupted in Venezuela . 
.. 
Bolivar thought this was the harbinger of future disorder and chaos that 
would eventually destroy Spanish American freedom. He viewed the 
federation to be formed at Panama as the only means to forestall such 
.. 
an eventuality. Bolivar envisioned the confederation as 11 A temple of 
sanctuary from criminal trends 11 • 13 He also was skeptical of the new 
republics' ability to govern themselves in a stable manner. As a result, 
he believed that a confederation, possibly acting as a protectorate, was 
.. 
the best solution. Bolivar hoped that the confederation would ensure 
the new republics time to mature safely until they were able to manage 
7 
their own affairs. 14 If the confederation could serve its function for 
.. 
ten to twelve .years, Bolivar reasoned, then Spanish American independ-
ence would survive. 1~ 
With the reactionary forces in Europe hungrily eyeing revolutionary 
America and with chaotic conditions and personal ambitions already 
inhibiting Spanish American cooperation, the individual republics could 
do little to help themselves. There was little hope for tangible aid 
from the United States. The only possible hope for British aid was 
based on the self interest of England. In 1824, therefore, the future 
of South American independence looked bleak. The only bright spots 
were Spain's retreat from the continent and the recently stated Monroe 
_.,, ... 
Doctrine. There was also Great Britain's 11 0aken Wall 11 serving to 
restrain the avaricious attempts of European recolonization. In view 
of the circumstances, confederation did seem to be the only meihod to 
assure survival of the South American Republics. 
.. .. 
Simon Bolivar generally has received credit for conceiving the 
.. 
idea of a Congress of American States .. Bolivar, however, was not the 
first to express the desire for a union of the Spanish American nations. 
The first call was recorded in 1810 with the 11 Declaration of the Rights 
of the People of Chile 11 • 16 Also in 1810, Juan Martinez of Chile said 
that America could not defend itself single-handedly. He continued 
that the day would come when America must unite in a congress. The 
first Chilean Constitution called for an alliance of American states. 
In 1813, C. Antonio Munoz Tebor, called upon all of Spanish America to 
unite or confederate under a central government to_act as a counter to 
revolutionary Europe. 17 Though not the first, Bolivar was certainly 
the most ardent and vocal of the proponents of union. His efforts and 
8 
his prestige inspired the individual treaties that preceeded the events 
at Panama. ~olivar conceived, planned, and ensured that his vision of 
American unity was attempted at the Panama Congress. 18 Bolivar first 
suggested a Spanish American confederation in his prophetic Jamaican 
Letter of 1815. In this letter, written at almost the nadir of his 
,. 
career, Bolivar expressed the wish that someday an assembly of American 
states would meet at the Isthmus of Panama. While there, he hoped these 
states would deliberate upon the issues of war and peace and American 
relations with the rest of the world. 19 This wish, coupled with diplo-
matic prodding, culminated in the Circular Letter of 1824, issued from 
Lima, Peru. This letter sounded the actual call for the convocation 
of the conference. 
,. 
Bolivar first envisioned the Panama Congress as a great 11 Amphic-
tyonic Counci1 11 which would settle discord between component nations 
and avoid war. 20 He also wanted to create an American Confederation 
of Republics in which all member nations retained their internal 
sovereignty but surrendered a portion of their external authority to a 
supreme power, which would be composed of representatives from each 
nation. This supreme power would guarantee peace, security, and prog-
ress to its members through mutual cooperation. 21 Bolivar felt such 
a supreme power could exist only in an assembly of plenipotentiaries 
from each country. This body would also have the power to act as a 
council in times of great danger and as a rallying point in time of 
conflict. It would also be a faithful interpreter of public treaties 
and a mediator of all their difficulties. 22 
.. 
Bolivar chose the Isthmus of Panama as the site of the proposed 
conference because it was centrally located, not only for America, but 
9 
,,. 
also for the world. Bolivar believed that the Panama Congress would be 
remembered centuries later as the agency which created Latin American 
public law and the compacts that solidifed the destiny of America. 23 
,,. 
One can best understand what Bolivar hoped to achieve by studying 
the instructions he gave to the Peruvian delegation. In his instruc-
,,. 
tions, Bolivar expressed the desire that the confederation, formed 
between Peru and Colombia, be extended to include the other nations 
then individually allied with the two states. He also wanted the 
delegates to make every effort to secure 11 the great compact of union 
league and perpetual confederation," against Spain and all other foreign 
intervention. He instructed the delegates to convince the assembly to 
declare Spain the aggressor in the conflict that was then being waged 
between them and to declare friendship and neutrality with the rest of 
the world. He further instructed them to have the assembly decide 
whether or not to invade the Caribbean islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
If the Conference decided to invade the islands, the delegates were to 
secure a treaty to this effect, if possible. The treaty would make 
the invasion a joint effort and would stipulate the amount of money, 
men, and equipment each nation was to contribute. 
,,. 
Another instruction Bolivar gave the Peruvians was to have the 
assembly confirm the Monroe Doctrine, thereby making it a multilateral 
policy of the hemisphere. In addition the assembled states should 
negotiate treaties of commerce, friendship, and consular operations. 
Future American relations with Haiti and Santo Domingo would also be 
,,. 
topics of discussion. Bolivar believed that the special circumstances 
arising from the African origin of the people of Haiti and Santo 
Domingo, as well as the peculiar commercial relations they retained 
10 
with France, made this a problem suitable for debate by the American 
nations. 
Another important instruction concerned a mutual offensive and 
defensive alliance between the members of the confederation. Treaties 
would assign specific quotas of men, ships, and money th~t each member 
was expected to provide the alliance. Members should be urged to h,elp 
each other stifle internal disorder by mutual cooperation. The 
Alliance would use force, if necessary, to assist the stricken govern-
.. 
ment. Finally, Bolivar instructed the Peruvians to insure that the 
conference adopt a plan of operations against Spain and a resolution 
urging an end to the African slave trade. 24 
.. 
Bolivar's wishes were carried out primarily by two individuals, 
Don Pedro Gual, Colombia's Foreign Minister, and Francisco de Paula 
.. 
Santander, Bolivar's vice-president in Colombia. Within two years 
these men had negotiated treaties of alliances with Peru, Chile, Buenos 
Aires, and Mexico. All of the treaties, except that with Buenos Aires, 
l16und each member to work for a pact of 11 perpetua1 union, 1 eague, and 
tonfederation 11 among the Spanish American nations. 25 
.. 
The wording of the treaties provide an insight into what Bolivar 
and the rest of the member nations wanted from the confederation. Once 
the treaties creating the confederation were signed and ratified by 
the member states, the confederation existed. The assembly at Panama 
would serve as the executive body of that confederation. The treaties 
bound each participant to a "perpetual union, league, and confederation. 11 
All of the treaties were animated by a wish for a speedy termination of 
the war with Spain and a feeling that Spanish American cooperation would 
achieve that end. 
ll 
The members pledged themselves to maintain their independence 
from Spain and to refuse compromising commercial concessions. All 
agreed to hold an assembly of the confederation at Panama. Each member 
of the confederation granted citizenship rights and commercial privi-
liges to all citizens of member states. All states joined in a "league 
of close alliance" for common defense and security and each bound itself 
to help member nations stifle any internal turmoil or rebellion against 
legally constituted authority. A member could invade and operate in 
another member's territory to quell such a rebellion, but only so long 
as its force respected the invaded nation's law and when time and con-
ditions were such that prior approval was inexpedient. 
Each treaty contained a provision for the protection and guarantee 
of the rights and immunities of the ministers sent to Panama. Each 
member nation agreed to furnish contingents of armed forces to be 
placed at the confederation's disposal. The size of the contingent 
was to be determined by the assembly. 26 There was also a stipulation 
that each would respect and succor the other nation'sprivateers. 27 
These treaties were the basis of the confederation, and expressed 
what the nations hoped to achieve. It is obvious from the treaties 
and letters of invitation sent by Mexico, Colombia, and Central America 
to the United States, that an alliance between the American states was 
the primary concern. The purpose of this alliance was to protect the 
member nations from Spanish or other foreign intervention. Pablo 
~ 
Obregon, Mexican Minister to the United States, told Secretary of 
State Henry Clay that one of the areas of general interest to all who 
would attend the congress was "resistance or opposition to the inter-
fering of any neutral power, in the question, and war of independence, 
12 
between the new powers of the continent, and Spain. 11 Mexico also felt, 
he told Clay, that opposition to colonization of America by European 
powers was another important question the assembled states must face. 
According to Mexico, those were the two principle subjects to be 
discussed. 28 
- .,. 
Senor Jose Maria de Salazar, the Colombian Minister to the United 
.,. 
States, echoed Obregon's sentiments in a letter to Secretary of State 
Clay. Salazar divided the potential subjects of discussion into two 
classes. The first class contained topics devoted purely to the prose-
cution of the war. The second class consisted of items of interest 
to the Americas in general. Under this second class of topics Salazar 
included 11 The manner in which a 11 col oni za ti on of European powers on 
the American Continent shall be resisted and their interference in the 
present contest between Spain and her former colonies prevented 11 as 
points of great interest. He also suggested alliances, possibly secret, 
to achieve that end. In the same letter, he mentioned the conference 
as an ideal opportunity for the United States to postulate and promote 
its principles of international law. He also suggested the abolition 
of the African slave trade and diplomatic relations with Haiti as 
possible topics that the Congress would want to discuss. 29 Senor 
Antonio Jose Canaz, the Central American Minister to the United States, 
also wrote a letter of invitation to Secretary of State Clay. In that 
.,. 
letter Canaz echoed Obregon and Salazar in their suggestion of an 
alliance to defend the New World from European aggression. He also 
felt that since Europe had created a continental alliance and had held 
a Congress to discuss questions of general interest, America should 
also call a general meeting. 30 
13 
Salazar's division of subjects into two classes was significant 
because it marked the first instance or need to do so. Before the 
invitations were sent to the United States, the Panama Congress was 
planned as an all, Spanish American affair. The only possible exception 
,. 
would be Great B~itain. In all of Bolivar's correspondence, before the 
invitations were extended to the United States, the Panama Congress is 
referred to as a conference of "American States formerly Spanish 
,. 
colonies," not as a hemispheric conference. 31 Bolivar did not favor 
United States representation because he felt it would endanger the 
possibility of confederation with Great Britain. 32 Several times 
,. 
throughout his correspondence, Bolivar stated that the United States 
should not be allowed to participate. One example of this sentiment is 
,. 
a letter sent to Santander on May 20, 1825. In this letter, Bolivar 
admonished Santander not to admit either La Plata or the United States 
to the confederation. He felt the confederation could survive quite 
well without either extreme of North or South. 33 
,. 
In another letter to Santander dated June 7, 1825, Bolivar again 
,. 
objected to making the confederation hemisphereic. Bolivar stated 
that he had not seen the plans for a continental confederation that 
included the United States and Haiti, but that he considered it ill-
advised to offer them membership. He further stated that the Haitians 
and the North Americans "are foreigners to us, 11 and that he could 
never consent to either being invited to Panama. 34 
This emphatic refusal to consent to United States representation 
,. 
at Panama was later revoked in a letter to Jose Rafael Revenga, the 
Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The letter dated April 8, 1826, 
stated 11 I am pleased that the United States is sending an envoy to the 
14 
Isthmus; no matter what the terms. 1135 This, of course, was long after 
the United States had been offered and had accepted the invitations to 
attend the Panama Congress. 
,. 
The distaste Bolivar felt for foreign members of the confedera-
tion did not extend to the British. In several of his letters, he 
expressed an ardent desire to ally with Great Britain either under the 
i 
protection of England or with Great Britain as a full partner. In a 
,. ,. ,. 
letter to Antonio Jose Sucre, dated January 22, 1826, Bolivar said that 
in a political sense an alliance with Great Britain would be a greater 
victory than Ayacucho. He continued, that once an alliance with 
,. 
Britain was achieved, Sucre could be assured of America's future 
,. 
11 happiness. 1136 In a more definite statement on this subject, Bolivar 
told Santander that the American Confederation could not survive unless 
Britain took it under its protection. 37 Bolivar considered British 
protection as fundamental to the whole concept of the Panama Congress 
and alliance. As such, he was not concerned with the membership of the 
congress, so long as it received envoys from Great Britain and did not 
antagonize the British. 38 His desire to avoid conflict with England 
caused him to fear the presence of the United States at the conference. 
He felt that the United States would pose complications and problems 
between the confederation and 11 Albion 11 , or Great Britain. 39 
Colombia, however, felt differently about the desirability of 
United States representation. Under the direction of Gaul and Santander, 
who both were greatly impressed by the recent statement of the Monroe 
Doctrine, Salazar was instructed to discover the United States• attitude 
towards an invitation to attend the sessions at Panama. The two 
Colombian leaders hoped to make the Monroe Doctrine a multilateral 
understanding and envisioned the Panama Congress as the vehicle to do 
so. 40 In Mexico's reply to the Circular Letter of 1824, President 
Guadalupe Victoria declared that he believed the United States should 
15 
be invited. In his opinion, the cause of independence and liberty did 
not belong exclusively to the former Spanish colonies and he for one, 
intended to invite the North Americans. 41 
From the above it is possible to $ee that the Panama Congress was 
, , 
definitely the creation of Simon Bolivar. and that through his efforts 
, 
and vision the conference was held. Bolivar wanted to form an inter-
national union comparable to the Holy Alliance in Europe, defend 
Spanish American independence, and promote peace and harmony among its 
, 
component members. It is equally obvious that Bolivar looked to Great 
Britain not the United States, as the league's protector and guide. 
While wanting to maintain close relations with the United States, he 
was not anxious for the Northern Republic to become a part of the 
Assembly of American States. With Great Britain a constituent member 
, 
of the assembly, Bolivar believed his league would be far more powerful 
than the Holy Alliance. 42 
, 
The Confederation, as viewed by Bolivar, would form a diplomatic 
council to settle disputes among members and act as a counter to the 
European alliance. He foresaw the growth of the union to eventually 
include most, if not all, of the former Spanish colonies. This union 
was also expected to enable those former colonies to face the world with 
a single front, while retaining domestic sovereignty within their own 
territories. The council or congress would concern itself only with 
matters of general interest to the American states and provide a contin-
ental defense force. 
Other Spanish American leaders viewed the objectives of the con-
"' ference in much the same way that Bolivar did. Differences arose, 
however, concerning United States representation at Panama. There was 
universal agreement, however, that the conference was to be the 
16 
assembly called for by the separate treaties of 11 perpetual union, league, 
and confederation. 11 This assembly was to produce an offensive and 
defensive alliance to insure Spanish American independence from either 
Spanish reconquest or European intervention. It was to be, then, first 
and foremost, a'congress called to assure Spanish American independence. 
All other concerns were secondary. 
The United States was aware of the planned Panama Congress from 
its beginnings in 1821. It was not until the spring of 1825, however;, 
that the United States was approached regarding attendance at the 
congress. 43 On April 7, 1825, Henry Clay informed President Adams of 
... 
a visit to his office by two South American representatives. Pablo 
"' "' Obregon, Minister from Mexico, and Jose Maria de Salazar, Minister from 
Colombia, had di.scussed with Clay the possibility of United States 
attendance at Panama. 44 
In a letter to Richard C. Anderson, the United States Minister to 
Colombia, Clay related what had transpired. The two South Americans, 
he said, realized that the United States could not participate in any 
discussion or act of the congress that would impair American neutrality. 
They both hoped, however, that the United States would send representa-
tives to the sessions that involved matters of general interest to the 
continent. Both men verbally offered to extend an official invitation 
later, if the United States would accept it. 45 
After receiving instructions from the President, Henry Clay 
17 
.. 
notified Obregon and Salazar that such an invitation would receive 11 all 
friendly consideration 11 by the United States. 1146 In a letter to the 
two, Clay said that the President believed that it was necessary to 
settle certain preliminary points before the congress convened. These 
points included: topics to be discussed, powers given the attending 
ministers, and the organization and method of action of the congress. 
If these matters could be satisfactorily settled, continued Clay, the 
United States would accept an invitation. 47 
.. 
Obregon and Salazar submitted written replies in early November, 
1825. Both notes were vague and failed to answer the questions that 
Adams had raised. Adams and Clay, however, decided to accept the 
.. 
invitations anyway. In his notes to Obregon and Salazar Clay waived 
the answers to the preliminary questions. This was done, he said, to 
avoid an unnecessary delay in the start of the congress. 48 
.. 
Obregon stated, in his official inuitations, that matters of 
general interest to the United States would include the resistance to 
European intervention and colonization in the Americas. He continued 
that since his government believed that all nations of the Americas 
were of one mind on resisting all forms of European intervention, it 
was necessary to meet and discuss methods to give this resistance 11 all 
.. 
possible force. 11 Other specific topics, Obregon felt, were impossible 
to enumerate. 
Without elaborating, he stated that Mexico would provide its 
delegates to Panama with ample powers, and he expected other countries 
.. 
to do the same. Obregon expressed his hope that the United States would 
be represented at the discussion of these topics and any others that 
were brought before the assembly. On behalf of Mexico he officially 
18 
invited the United States to attend the Panama Congress. 49 
Salazar's letter of invitation also contained only a partial 
fulfillment of the President's request. Salazar divided the topics of 
discussion at the congress into two categories, one of interest to the 
belligerants and the other was of general interest to all the inhabi-
tants of the Americas. In the letter, he confined his remarks to the 
second category, saying the United States was not expected to engage in 
,' 
any talks as a belligerant. Salazar suggested that at Panama the United 
States could work to achieve certain principles of international law, 
which it was then suggesting. He said the South American countries 
would be happy to look to the United States as a guide in these matters, 
in deference to its greater experience. He also mentioned resistance 
to European intervention and colonization in America as possible topics. 
The threat of this, Salazar believed, was of great interest to the 
entire hemisphere. He suggested the possibility of a secret alliance 
uniting all the Americas. Among the other topics Salazar discussed 
were the abolition of the African slave trade and future relations with 
H "t" 50 a1 1. 
Obviously, the inexperienced diplomats of Latin America failed to 
foresee the difficulties that could arise from such a loose format for 
the congress. Without an itemized agenda, it would be impossible to 
give detailed instructions to the envoys. In the United States, where 
governmental power was limited only to that which enabled a functionary 
to perform his duties, the vague term 11 ample powers 11 proved to be very 
difficult to accept. The lack of adequate information about all aspects 
of the Panama Congress proved to be a major obstacle in the congressional 
debate on this issue. With the acceptance of the invitation, pending 
19 
Senate approval, the status of the Panama invitation left the realm of 
foreign affairs and the Secretary of States Office. It entered into 
a new arena~ the hurly burly arena of domestic politics in the United 
States. 
Most studies concerning the Panama Congress, seem to proceed from 
the basic premise that the United States should have been represented. 
This attitude then tends to relegate the opposition to either short 
sighted politicians or personally motivated radicals. In either case, 
the opposition is labeled as wrong, regardless of the motive. By 
viewing the Spanish American antecedents of the assembly, one can see 
which faction seemed to have the clearer grasp of ·the situation and 
could formulate the best policy, at that time, towards the conference 
and its possible consequences. 
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CHAPTER I I 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE DEBATE 
During his four years as President of the United States, John Q. 
Adams was under intense political pressure. Some of this political 
pressure stemmed from his austere and tactless personality. Some of 
the opposition resulted from the nationalistic programs he proposed. 
Adams also faced a growing, vocal political opposition arising from 
I 
the political controversy of the Presidential Election of 1824. It is 
impossible to deny the existence of a political feud between the Adams-
Clay faction and Jackson-Crawford-Calhoun forces in the Republican 
party. This. highly partisan and bitter election had been waged among 
I 
Andrew Jacks'on of Tennessee, Henry Clay from Kentucky, John Q. Adams of 
Massachusetts, William Crawford of Georgia, and John C. Calhoun of 
South Carolina. John Calhoun, early in the campaign, decided to 
withdraw from the presidential race and instead ran successfully for 
the vice-presidency. Calhoun based his decision on the Pennsylvania 
nominating convention held in March of 1824. That convention suggested 
a Jackson-Calhoun ticket. Calhoun accepted the verdict and campaigned 
for the second office. 1 
William Crawford, the favorite in the race, had received the 
. l . t. 2 congress1ona caucus nom1na ion. Crawford 1 s reputation was sullied, 
however, after his implication in a Treasury scandal. In addition, at 
one point in the campaign, Crawford physically attacked President 
23 
Monroe with his cane during an angry discussion over patronage. 
Crawford angrily declared that the President needed a head cracking, 
24 
which he promptly attempted to deliver. Monroe successfully defended 
himself with the aid of some handy fire-place tongs. Although Crawford 
later apologized, Monroe refused to aid his cause any further. 3 
./ 
Crawford's chances of wirining the election were totally eliminated, 
however, when he was struck by a series of near fatal strokes that left 
him partially paralyzed. 4 
Adams, Jackson, and Clay had all been nominated by state 
legislatures. Of the four candidates, Jackson received the largest 
number of popular and electoral votes, followed by Adams, Crawford, and 
Clay, in that order. Since none of the four candidates received a 
majority of the electoral votes, the House of Representatives had the 
task of selecting the new President. 5 
According to the provisions of the Twelfth Ammendment, Congress 
could consider only the top three candidates. Clay, as the fourth, 
was eliminated from further consideration. Clay was then freed to act 
independently, in his own best interests, and as Speaker of the House, 
he controlled a great deal of influence. 6 
Henry Clay was a practical politician. He carefully surveyed the 
political scene of 1824 to secure his best advantage and he examined 
the attributes of each of the remaining candidates. He eliminated 
Crawford at the outset, because of his illness. He then turned his 
attention to Adams and Jackson. Clay was inclined to throw his support 
to Adams. John Q. Adams, Clay knew, would never become a permanent 
party leader. His power was too localized in New England and he was 
not as personally popular as Clay. Also, Clay could hope to succeed 
Adams as President. Finally, Clay believed that Adams was better fit 
for the job than was Andrew Jackson. Clay could see no advantage to 
an alliance with Jackson. Jackson was from the West, as was Clay. 
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Cooperation between the two was difficult as neither wished to be 
subordinate to the other. Finally, Jackson already had an heir 
apparent in John C. Calhoun, who had formed an early alliance with the 
General when he left the presidential race for the vice-presidency. 
Advantages of an a 11 i ance with Adams and the disadvantages presented by 
Jackson convinced Clay to support John Q. Adams in the House election. 7 
The House of Representatives elected John Q. Adams as President. 
When the decision was announced, Andrew Jackson's supporters cried foul. 
They believed that Jackson, who had received the most popular votes, had 
been denied his rightful place as President. They charged that by 
electing Adams, the Congress had subverted the will of the people. 
Later, when Adams announced the appointment.of Henry Clay as Secretary 
of State, the already angry Jacksonians were incensed. Jackson's 
supporters charged that Adams and Clay had made a 11 corrupt bargain, 11 
which kept Jackson out of office and demonstrated the depths to which 
the 11 Eastern Establishment 11 would stoop to maintain itself in power. 
The old Jeffersonian Republican Party split as a result of the 
election controversy of 1824. This division denoted the end of the 
11 Era of Good Feelings 11 • Jackson and his supporters withdrew to plan 
for the upcoming presidential contest of 1828. Calhoun and his 
supporters, while allied with the Jacksonians, were distracted by the 
new development of sectionalism and the resultant changes from a 
nationalist to a sectionalist viewpoint and policy. Adams, and his ally 
Clay, were left with roughly one third of the party to pursue their 
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nationalist objectives. 8 Thomas Hart Benton, a Senator from Missouri, 
stated in his autobiography, Thirty Years View, that Adams inaugural 
address "furnished a topic against Mr. Adams, and went to the recon-
struction of parties on the old line of strict or latitudinous inter-
pretation of the Constitution. 119 The inaugural address, nationalistic 
in scope, proposed federally funded internal improvements, a national 
bank, and protective tariffs. The address was so broad, especially in 
the realm of internal improvements, that even Clay was startled by it.10 
Benton said, 
It was, therefore, clear from the beginning that the new 
administration was to have a settled and strong opposition~ 
and that founded in principles of government - the same 
principles under different forms, which had discriminated 
parties at the commencement of the federal government ... 
the Federalists going for Mr. Adams, the Republicans against 
him, with the mass of the younger generation.11 
With a divided party and a tarnished minority election victory achieved 
in the House of Representatives, it was clear from the outset that 
Adams administration was in trouble. 
Jackson, at first, did not believe the charges levied against 
Adams. He remained solid in his trust of the new President, despite 
pressure from his supporters. Jackson remained friendly with Adams and 
was the first to congratulate him after his inaugural. The two men had 
been friends since Adams had supported Jackson over the Florida border 
violation controversy of 1818. The friendship that had lasted through-
out and after the campaign ended, however, when Adams nominated Clay 
as Secretary of State. When he heard the news, Jackson became bitter 
and resentful. He believed that Adams had deceived him and that, 
indeed, a 11 corrupt bargain 11 had been made. 12 
Most historians, however, agree that there never was a bargain, 
27 
corrupt or otherwise, between Adams and Clay. Holmes Alexander claims 
that Martin Van Buren knew that Adams offered De Witt Clinton the post 
of Secretary of State before he offered it to Clay. 13 In any event, 
·Jackson, Calhoun, and their followers, did believe that a deal of some 
kind had been made. They believed that they had been cheated of their 
rightful victory. They were determined to prevent such an occurance 
in the future. The controversy over the election of 1824 provided a 
firm foundation on which to build an opposition to Adams. 
The first half of the 1820 1 s was an unstable period in American 
politics. This lack of stability was partially responsible for Adams' 
problems as President and for some of the opposition to the Panama 
Congress. A collapse of old political alliances was underway. This 
breakdown was caused by internal dissention over internal improvements, 
tariffs, and other nationalistic programs. While Adams and Clay clung 
to the nationalism that evolved during and after the War of 1812, the 
country moved towards sectional ism. Adams outdated philosophy brought 
him into conflict with the sectionalist interests, and part of the 
animosity aimed at the Panama Congress was sectional. By persevering 
in an outdated, unpopular, nationalist philosophy, Adams worked as his 
own enemy and guaranteed himself opposition. 14 
Slavery, one of the growing sectional issues, was beginning to 
play a larger role in the ~eryday political life of the times. The 
question of slavery colored a variety of issues not immediately con-
nected with it. The Panama Congress proved to be one of those issues. 
As President, Adams can be viewed as one of the first leaders in the 
crusade against slavery. The Southern opposition linked Adams, aboli-
tion, and the Panama Congress to a broad conspiracy. Opposition to 
Adams and his policies helped weld the South into a more cohesive 
political unit and aided the rise of sectionalism. The roots of 
Southern antipathy to sending representativesto Panama lay hidden in 
the Southern slave holders• opposition to Adams and his philosophy. 15 
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Slavery and the rise of sectionalism were not the only objections 
expressed concerning United States participation at Panama. Many 
opponents were alarmed at the constitutional implications of the entire 
question. They expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of sending· 
official representatives. Official representatives could involve the 
United States in a violation of its best interests and traditional 
f . l. 16 ore1gn po icy. 
Supporters of the mission were numerous, but not as flamboyant as 
the opposition. The two greatest proponents, of course, were John Q. 
Adams and Henry Clay. Clay was known as a champion of the Latin 
American cause and of Pan Americanism. 17 In a speech to Congress in 
1810, he had suggested the formation of an American System, with the 
United States as its center and Latin America as partners. Clay 
--~-""' 
continued that the United States would become the depository of the 
world 1 s commerce as a result of this partnership. 18 
Clay was impressed with the concept of the Panama Congress. On 
November 8, 1825, he confided to Albert Gallatin that the President had 
agreed to accept the invitation and asked Gallatin to become one of 
the ministers. Clay declared that the congress would discuss matters 
of high import to the entire hemisphere. 19 He called the deputation 
to Panama the most important mission ever sent by the United States, 
except for the mission which negotiated the United States• independence~0 
Clay believed that the United States could be represented at the Panama 
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Congress without endangering its neutrality. This consideration was an 
especially delicate point, since the Latin American republics were 
still officially at war with Spain, and the Panama Congress would 
discuss measures concerning the prosecution of that war. Clay made this 
point in two letters to private individuals. In November of 1825, he 
wrote to James Brown that the United States was to be represented at 
Panama. He continued that United States neutrality would not be damaged 
by our presence there. He also reiterated that matters of great impor'-
tance would be discussed at Panama. 21 In another letter to Peter B. 
Porter, Clay restated essentially what he had told Brown. 22 
Adams also favored United States participation at Panama. He 
believed that the main reason for attending the Panama Congress, was to 
show United States' sympathy for the Latin American independence move-
ments. In a message to the Senate on December 26, 1825, he called this 
the "decisive inducement" and said that he intended United States 
representation "to show by this token of respect ... the interest we 
take in their welfare and our disposition to comply with their wishes!123 
Adams said basically the same thing in his message to the House. The 
invitation demonstrated that the Latin American nations wanted our 
friendship and counsel. To refuse to attend, he told the House, would 
not be in keeping with our concern for their welfare. President Adams 
told the House that he would personally dispatch ministers if their 
only function was to give advice. He believed, however, that the 
Panama Congress presented an opportunity for the United States to aid in 
the 11 dispensing of the blessings of freedom and promote peace and 
prosperity. 1124 
Adams was also concerned over future commercial relations between 
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the two sections of the hemisphere. He mentioned that, in their lack 
of experience, some of the Latin American nations were tempted to give 
favorable trade concessions to Spain as a means of purchasing their 
independence. Some of the same countries, he continued, contemplated 
commercial concessions to Europe in return for recognition of their 
independence. These concessions, claimed Adams, would have had a 
deleterious effect on United States trade in the area. The United 
States, Adams ,said, had persuaded the new nations to drop these obstruc-
tions to its commerce. Adams believed, however, that the Panama 
Congress was a good opportunity to urge full, impartial reciprocity on 
the new Latin American nations. While at Panama, Adams thought the 
United States could make reciprocity of commercial relations a perman-
ent part of all commercial agreements among members. 25 
Thus both Adams and Clay, the two leaders of the executive branch, 
favored United States attendance at Panama: Clay because he hoped to 
implement his American System and because of his desire to oppose the 
tyranny of Europe; and Adams because he wanted to protect the United 
States commercial interests and show friendship to the new nations. 
The two encountered much difficulty in securing approval of the mission 
from the Senate. One of the first opponents to appear was Nathaniel 
Macon. 
Nathaniel Macon, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in 1826, was also President Pro Tempore of the Senate during the debates 
over the Panama mission. Although he was not a supporter of either 
Jackson or Calhoun, Macon opposed attendance at Panama on several 
counts. 26 Although the Foreign Relations Committee Report was primarily 
the work of Littleton W. Tazewell, Senator from Virginia and an 
opponent of the proposed mission, the committee report did reflect 
Macon's feelings. 27 Macon feared an extension of executive power 
1arising from the Panama issue. He believed that John Q. Adams was 
attempting to usurp all the perogatives of the federal government. 28 
Together with an old friend, John Randolph, another Virginia Senator 
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and opponent of the Panama Congress, Macon represented a solid Southern 
wall of opposition to everything Northern, commercial, or anti-slavery~9 
Both Macon and Randolph saw the Panama Congress as all three. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Macon and 
composed of all Southern senators except for Elijah Mills of 
Massachusetts, submitted an unfavorable report concerning the United, 
States attendance at the Panama Congress. The report outlined most 
of the oppositions major objections. The Committee opposed sending 
delegates primarily because the mission represented a repudiation of 
traditional United States foreign policy. The report construed the 
Panama Congress as an "entangling a 11 i ance" and a new technique in 
foreign affairs. Sending envoys to Panama, the Committee claimed, 
would conflict with the United States policy against entangling 
alliances. The report continued, that the true interest of the United 
States lay in avoiding entangling alliances while maintaining an 
attitude of good .will towards all nations. The United States had 
been among the first nations to recognize the independence of the new 
republics and had already shown itself to be their friend. The 
Committee did not believe that any other tokens of friendship were 
needed, especially if they entailed violating or abandoning the tradi-
tional foreign policies of the United States. 
The report stated that there was not enough information available 
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to define adequately the nature of the Panama Congress. There was no 
explanation of the objectives of the conference, the powers to be giV,~n 
the envoys, or the organization of the Panama Congress. The Committee 
denounced as neglectful the failure of the executive to obtain this 
information. The United States, before committing itself to attend the 
Panama Congress, should know more about it. The Committee believed 
that the President had erred by not insisting on the fulfillment of 
his stipulations for accepting the invitation. The Committee found it 
inexpedient to send envoys with undefined "ample powers" to an undefined 
international conference, with undefined goals, which would be imple-
mented in undefined ways. 30 
The Committee stated that the mission would violate the United 
States• neutral position in the war between Spain and her former 
colonies. This problem was another basis for opposition to the Panama 
Congress. Opponents believed that the purpose of the invitation was 
to lure the United States into an anti-Spanish alliance with Latin 
America. The possibility that entangling alliances might destroy 
United States• neutrality worried both Macon and the Foreign Relations 
Committee. The Committee and Macon further agreed that the European 
threat to hemispheric security no longer existed. United States and 
British opposition to European intervention in Latin America rendered 
that threat impotent. There was no reason to try novel designs for 
protection if there was no threat. 31 
Point by point, the Committee Report discussed the proposed topics 
of discussion and refuted the reasons proposed for attending the 
conference. The report based its judgment upon the letters of invita-
tion from Mexico, Colombia, and Central America and Adams• message to 
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the Senate. The letters of invitation expressed what the Latin 
Americans expected from the United States; the President's message out-
lined what he hoped to achieve by attendance. The report also high-
lighted certain areas of conflict between Latin American expectations 
and United States' desires. These gaps in understanding, the report 
stated, would only lead to hostility and dissention between the two 
areas. The Committee also noted the executive's failure to inform the 
Senate concerning Latin American expectations in his message to that 
body. 
The report first discussed the Colombian and Mexican proposal to 
resist interference in the Latin American wars of independence. 
Colombia suggested the creation of a secret alliance, of the members 
of the Panama Congress, to resist such interference. The letters of 
invitation had listed resistance to outside interference in the war as 
the principal topic to come before the Panama Congress. The President~ 
however, had not mentioned the topic, or the possibility of any such 
discussion, in any of his correspondence with the Senate. Adams, the 
Senate was reminded, had said that the United States was not interested 
in the formation of alliances at Panama. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee believed that these opinions were too widely separated to 
make cooperation ,at Panama feasable. The major object of the confer-
ence, claimed the Committee, was the creation of an alliance against 
European interference in the affairs of Latin America. The United 
States' position on alliances conflicted with the wishes and best 
interests of Latin America. This could only result in alienation at 
Panama. By attending the Panama Congress, critics claimed, the United 
States would only work against its own desires and interests. 
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The second great objective of the Panama Congress, according to 
the letters of invitation, was the organization of resistance to any 
future European attempts to colonize the New World. The United States 
position was again in conflict with Latin American desires on this 
issue. The conflict arose over the method, however, not the objecti~e. 
The goal of the Latin Americans was a mutual defense treaty signed by 
the nations assembled at Panama. The United States, according to the 
President's message, believed that each nation should resist all 
colonization attempts within its own borders. Basically stated, the 
United States' policy was one of self defense, not mutual defense. The 
Committee report stated that the right of self defense was obvious and 
was inherent in sovereignty. The United States did not need to attend 
an international conference to state it. 
The Committee report next disputed the proposed abolition of the 
I 
African slave trade. Again it was pointed out, there was no mention of 
this as a possible topic of discussion in the President's official 
correspondence to the Senate. The report stated that the United States 
was fighting the slave trade with its moral influence. The Committee 
did not believe, however, that the United States had the right to 
ascend a moral pedestal and dictate its morality to other nations. As 
to future relations with Haiti, another subject left unmentioned by the 
President, the Committee stated that any nation should remain free to 
decide who it would recognize or who it would not. The United States 
should not let its future political connections be determined by a 
group vote at an assembly of foreign states. 
The Committee then examined Adams' stated reasons for seeking 
United States representation at Panama. The Committee was not sure 
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that the conference would receive topics of discussion from the floor. 
The Treaties of League and Confederation between the other assembled 
states creating the Panama Congress did not indicate such a possibility. 
The Committee, however, discussed the President's proposed topics as if 
they were assured of discussion at Panama. 
In Latin America, many leaders spoke of purchasing European recog-
nition of independence by granting advantageous commercial concessions. 
These concessions would necessarily discriminate against the United 
States commerce. Adams suggested that the Panama Congress was the 
ideal body for the United States to urge commercial reciprocity on the 
new Latin American nations. The Committee stated, however, that it 
could not see how United States interference in the new nation's 
commerce could be construed as a friendly action. Commerce and trade 
principles were complex and contingent upon many variables. If the 
special concessions were extended then it must be assumed that the 
action was taken in the best interest of the granting nation. Any 
action by the United States to prevent such concessions could not be 
considered as being in the best interests of the Latin American repub-
lics. Again, the United States would find itself contravening its own 
desires and interests. The Committee believed, therefore, that the 
negotiation of principles of commerce and trade was best left to conven-
tional channels of diplomacy. 
In his message to the Senate, the President had expressed two 
other desires. The first was to establish principles of maritime 
neutrality and navigation in time of war. The Committee noted that 
since the Latin American nations were at war, any such compacts could 
be viewed as alliances and seriously damage the United States' 
neutrality. The President also desired to help establish reljgious 
toleration in Latin America. Adams believed that it was the United 
States' duty to convince the new republic that liberty extended to 
religious matters. The Committee said that the United States had no 
moral or political right to interfere in this matter. Such interfer-
ence represented an unnecessary and unwarranted intrusion into their 
domestic affairs. If the United States pressed this issue in Panama, 
the report continued, it would only create hostility and dissension. 
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In summary the report stated that there was no agreement between 
the Latin Americans and the United States. Each envisioned the Panama 
Congress differently. These differences could only negate any efforts 
by the United States to build influence in the area by its attendance. 
The report continued that the United States' neutrality would be lost 
through association with the belligerent cause. All possible benefits, 
the report concluded, were either outweighed by probable negative 
consequences or better achieved through traditional forms of diplomacy. 
The Committee concluded that the sending of ministers to Panama was not 
expedient and requested that the Senate so advise the President. 32 
Nathaniel Macon and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report 
definitely opposed the Panama mission. The report was the base upon 
which subsequent criticism was built. Other speakers elaborated, but 
the report expressed the core of the opposition's complaints. 
Robert Hayne of South Carolina also opposed the proposed mission. 
A member of the Finance and Naval Affairs Committee, he was also a 
leader of the developing sectional Southern party. Hayne feared Latin 
American economic competition with the South. He saw Latin America as 
a poor customer for Southern goods and a dangerous competitor of the 
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United States in wheat, tobacco, livestock, and cotton. Hayne led the 
fight against Latin American competition during the tariff debates of 
1824 and continued his opposition to the Panama mission in 1826. 33 
Thomas Hart Benton, Senator from Missouri, was another leading 
opponent of the Panama Congress. Benton, who described the whole con-
cept as an 11 abortion 11 , insinuated later that the senators who voted for 
the measure received large amounts of executive patronage. 34 Benton, 
as a defender of slavery, strongly opposed the mission and fought John 
Sargent's nomination as minister to the assembly because of the latters 
anti-slavery beliefs. John M. Berrien, a Senator from Georgia, was a 
solid member of the Southern clique. He, too, opposed the Panama 
Congress because it threatened slavery. Berrien also believed that the 
mission would violate the constitution of the United States. 
John Randolph of Roanoak, joined the Senate opposition to Adams 
and to the proposed Panama mission. Randolph firmly believed the 
"corrupt bargain" charges. One of Randolph's speeches on the floor of 
the Senate led to a duel, fortunately bloodless, between Henry Clay 
and himself. Randolph viewed any discussion involving slavery as an 
attack upon that institution. He spoke violently against the Panama 
Congress as a conspiracy designed to foment slave rebellion in the 
South. 
Martin Van Buren of New York also spoke against United States' 
representation at Panama. A staunch supporter of William Crawford, he 
remained with his chosen candidate until the end. Van Buren made no 
overtures to the Jackson-Calhoun coalition until the Panama Congress 
controversy. After deciding the mission was unconstitutional and at 
variance with American foreign policy, he approached Calhoun to 
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ascertain his opinion. Van Buren formed his alliance with Jackson and 
Calhoun after he formed his own opposition to the Panama mission. 35 
Van Buren believed that the Panama Congress was belligerent in nature 
and that the United States would forfeit its neutrality if it attended. 
Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun were also noted opponents of 
the mission. Bitter over the election of 1824, Jackson opposed all of 
Adams' policies. This bitterness, however, was not all .that motivated 
him in this instance. In a letter to James K. Polk, a friend and 
fellow member of the opposition, Jackson described the proposed mission 
as "one of the most dangerous and alarming schemes that ever entered 
the head of a visionary politician". He told Polk that the mission 
was a regrettable departure from the traditional lines of United States 
foreign policy. By pursuing Washington's neutral policy, Jackson wrote, 
the country had grown prosperous and was at peace with the world. To 
abandon such a policy 11 so wise in itself and so beneficial 11 , displayed 
to Jackson a weakness 11 not paralleled in the history of our country. 1136 
John C. Calhoun, Jackson's political ally, was John Q. Adams' vice-
president. Calhoun was loyal to Jackson; Jackson's enemies were 
Calhoun's enemies. Calhoun was also a staunch defender of the South's 
rights and perogatives. 
Martin Van Buren was not the only Northern opponent to the Panama 
Congress. Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire, Mahlon Dickerson of New 
Jersey, John Chandler of Maine, William Findlay of Pennsylvania, and 
Elias K. Kane of Illinois also fought United States attendance at 
Panama. They represented a sizable portion of the opposition's 
strength in the Senate. The Panama mission was generally popular in 
the North, however, and these men often voted against the wishes of 
their constituents. 
The issue of the United Stqtes 1 representation at the Panama 
Congress excited great debate in the country. The Senate opposition 
labored under the handicap of secrecy. Its arguments and logic, 
39 
expressed on the Senate floor in executive proceedings, did not become 
public knowledge until after the debate was over and ministers were 
sent. The mission's proponents, on the' other hand, had free access 
to the nation's press and chided opposition Senators for their obstin-
ance and delay. 37 
Many scholars have labeled the opposition as merely partisan. 
Partisan politics was an important element in this question. Other 
issues, however, occupied equally prominent positions. Opponents of 
the Panama Congress presented three major objections to United States 
participation. These objections concerned slavery, foreign policy, and 
constitutionality. Each of these three areas of objection presented 
serious obstacles to United States participation at the Panama Congress. 
These areas of objection were philosophical not political. In some 
cases, the abolition of slavery and the diplomatic recognition of 
Haiti, they were also sectional. Sectionalism was the wave of the polit-
ical future in 1824. Debates involving interpretations of the Constitu-
tion and philosophies of government were traditional. The question of 
United States representation at Panama involved both of them. From the 
time and manner which John Q. Adams introduced the question to the 
Senate, it was assured a strong opposition. This opposition would have 
been present regardless of who was President. The entire matter was too 
much a deviation from traditional policy. It was also too deeply 
involved in the rising debates over slavery and constitutional interpre-
tation. 
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CHAPTER III 
SECTIONALISM AND THE PANAMA CONGRESS 
Growing Southern sectionalism and defensiveness over slavery was a 
major cause of congressional opposition to the proposed mission to the 
Panama Congress. The several treaties and letters of invitation 
extended to the United States by Mexico and Colombia listed the aboli-
tion of the African slave trade and the future diplomatic relations with 
Haiti as possible subjects of discussion at the Panama Congress. Both 
of these topics aggravated the growing Southern defensiveness concerning 
the institution of slavery. Haiti was an all black, former slave sta!te 
that freed itself from French colonial rule. In the bloody slave revolt 
that freed the island, exslaves butchered their former owners and the 
white inhabitants of the island. Terror was a common weapon. Women 
and children of both colors were victims of the slaughter. 
The South was afraid that the example of Haiti would inspire its 
own slave population to revolt. Thus for the South, it was impossible 
to recognize the independence of Haiti. The South believed that diplo-
matic relations with the island would disasterously jeapordize Southern 
welfare. John B. Berrien, Senator from Georgia, strongly stated South-
ern fears in a speech to the Senate. The question at Panama, he 
declared was not 11 if11 we should recognize Haiti, but the 11 character 11 of 
the diplomatic relations the United States would ultimately have with 
the island. He believed that the confederated states of Latin Americi]. 
42 
wanted to perpetrate slave revolts in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and in the 
other areas of the hemisphere where slavery existed. 1 
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Berrien was afraid that if emancipated slaves came into the United 
States as dipTomatic envoys, they would spread rebellion among the 
slave population in the South. Revolution, he contended, would be 
spread by example, if by no other means. For this reason, said Berrien, 
the United States could not tolerate diplomatic relations with Haiti. 
To surrender the decision, concerning the recognition of Haiti to a 
body of foreign governments, he thought, was the 11 most odious 11 feature 
of the Panama Congress. 2 
Thomas H. Benton of Missouri also stated Southern fears on this 
issue. For thirty-three years, he said, the United States had engaged 
in commerce with Haiti. During that time no black or mulatto consuls 
were accepted from the island. The peace of eleven states of the Union, 
he stated, would not permit the exhibition of the fruits of a successful 
slave rebellion in this country. Benton further stated that the ques-
tion was not open to debate in any forum in the United States or at an 
international conference abroad. The discussion of Haitian recognition, 
because of its potentially inflamatory nature, must remain taboo. 
Benton believed that the mere discussion of the topic could inspire 
slave revolts in the South. Benton foresaw no other eventuality if 
former slaves, freed through rebellion, were allowed to parade through 
the streets of the United States. Their example to the Southern slave 
would make the situation in the South extremely dangerous. 3 
John Randolph, the flamboyant .and eccentric Senator from Virginia, 
was also unalterably opposed to the mission to Panama and the recogni-
tion of the island republic of Haiti. In Randolph's mind, the entire 
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question of Spanish American independence and its consequences were to 
be feared. Randolph was especially worried about the abolitionist 
nature of the Latin American independence movements. 
In Spanish America, Revolutionary political thought was based on 
the French inspired principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. 
These ideals flourished in Latin America during the revolutionary period 
despite their contradiction of Latin American realities. Many Latin 
Americans owned slaves and exploited the independence movements to 
acquire more; yet they continued to espouse these liberal sentime'nts. 4 
Since the American South possessed little first hand knowledge of the 
Spanish American scene, Southerners had little cause to suspect that 
Latin Americans followed a double standard when they spoke of liberty 
and equality. The South saw the first three Chilean constitutions 
which contained provisions for eventual emancipation of slaves. 5 Many 
in the South saw the Panama Congress as an attempt to extend the 
emancipation philosophy throughout the Caribbean. They interpreted 
this as a direct threat to their own existence. 
Randolph feared that the emancipation proclamations coming from 
the new republics would arouse and inflame the passions of Southern 
slaves and eventually lead to slave revolts in the United States. 
Randolph saw Spanish America as an instigator of domestic slave rebel-
1 ion. Drawing freely on the example of horror that the Haitian inde-
pendence struggle provided, Randolph declared that recognition of 
Haitian sovereignty would inflame the domestic slave population and 
rebellion and terror were the only logical results. He continued that 
the Latin American policy of emancipation and the recognition of Haiti 
would invariably lead to killing and bloodshed on both sides of the 
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color line. He believed that the example presented by Latin America 
was incompatible with Southern tranquility. Randolph gloomily forecast 
that the possibility of a slave rebellion in the United States was 
increasing because of the Spanish American situation. He believed that 
something had to be done to decrease the threat or catastrophe would 
result. 6 
In his much lauded speech against the Panama mission, Robert T. 
Hayne of South Carolina continued to tie the issue of domestic slavery 
to the discussion of the recognition of Haiti and the Panama Congress. 
First, said Hayne, the issue of domestic slavery must be considered as 
a delicate matter of concern only to those states directly involved. 
The topic should not be considered for discussion by any state of the 
union or by foreign governments. Under the Constitution the Congress 
of the United States, he claimed, did not have the perogitive to debate 
the issue of slavery. It was obvious, then, that such a topic was 
totally unsuited for discussion by United States envoys at a foreign 
congress. Where slavery was concerned, Hayne continued, there was 
nothing the South was prepared to see discussed in any forum, especially 
an international one. Nor would the South consent to a discussion of 
Haitian recognition, under the present circumstances, with the revolu-
tionary governments of Latin America. It was his firm belief that any 
discussion of slavery, or related questions such as the recognition of 
Haiti, would imperil a large segment of the Union. He also displayed a 
sensitivity regarding Southern rights. He said, "To call into question 
our rights is to grievously violate them 117 This was a clear intimation 
that the South considered the whole issue as not only a threat to their 
physical safety but also a possible threat to their political and 
institutional well being as well. 
The possibility of the United States recognizing Haitian inde-
pendence and commencing diplomatic relations with the island was 
considered a· serious threat to the security of the South. Slave 
rebellions incited by the Haitian examples of revolt and emancipation 
were very real possibilities in the Southern mind. These fears were 
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the primary reasons for the South's opposition to the mission to Panama. 
The proposed mission was also conceived by the South as a broad but 
subtle attack on the entire institution of slavery. The Panama Congress 
represented an opportunity for the Spanish American revolutionaries to 
carry their doctrine of emancipation to the island of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. This eventuality was considered by some in the South as only a 
preliminary step to the spreading of emancipation to the Southern 
states themselves. 
The South had other fears concerning the Panama Congress. The 
Latin American states were on record as being in favor of emancipation. 
Blacks and mulattos held positions of influence and power in many of 
the governments and armies of the Spanish American nations. The South 
assumed that emancipation sentiment would be strong at the Panama 
Congress. To defend its rights against attack the South believed it 
would need a staunch defender of the institution of slavery and the 
Southern way of life at the conference. 
The men President Adams had nominated did not possess those quali-
fications. John Sargent of Pennsylvania was the exact opposite of what 
the South desired. Sargent had been a strong proponent of the Missouri 
Compromise, and the South believed he was an abolitionist. Richard C. 
Anderson, from Kentucky, was the second proposed member of the 
47 
delegation. While Anderson was acceptable to the South, his presence 
was not considered sufficient protection for Southern rights. Many 
agreed with Senator Thomas Hart Benton that Anderson should be given 
an assistant on the mission, not an opponent. 8 The Southern Congress-
men wanted both envoys to be sympathetic to the Southern cause. Any-
thing less, in their opinion, would not sufficiently represent their 
interests. 
Senator Hayne referred to Sargent as an 11 acknowledged abol itionist11 • 
Sargent was a respectable man, the South Carolinian said, but an 
advocate of the Missouri restriction. Hayne believed that Sargent was 
not a man to whom the South could trust its interests. He was not a 
man to plead the South 1 s cause at the Panama Congress. 9 Thomas Hart 
Benton went even further in his rejection of Sargent. He described 
Sargent as the head of an abolitionist society whose principles, when 
carried to their logical extension, justified slave rebellions whether 
in Haiti or the United States. Benton continued that Sargent was o~ 
record as having said on the floor of the Senate, in debate over the 
Missouri controversy, that slavery 11 could not exist 11 • 10 
These attacks, though directed at the question of Haitian inde-
pendence and the lack of a strong Southern voice as a member of the 
diplomatic mission, manifested Southern fears that the Panama Congress 
and the United States• representation at it would vitally affect 
Southern interests and welfare. Southern Congressmen were aware of the 
prevailing sentiment in Spanish America and knew it ran contrary to 
their own. The South was also basically afraid of any plan originated 
by Simon Bolivar. Southerners could see the ultimate design of emanci-
pation behind them. 11 
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During the debates concerning the proposed delegation to Panama, 
the development of a Southern sectional party in the United States was 
then in its early stages. Though just beginning, this largely unknown 
party made its presence felt. The growing spectre of sectionalism, 
coupled with Southern antipathy towards John Q. Adams and his adminis-
tration, was a fundamental reason behind the violent attack·s. The South 
was antagonistic towards Adams and his entire philosophy, which they 
believed to be anti-slavery. This Southern clique made up of much of 
12 
the opposition towards Adams and the Panama Congress. 
Another issue closely tied to the fundamental and overriding issue 
of slavery was the abolition of the African slave trade. Southern 
senators also opposed United States participation in a discussion of 
this subject. While claiming that they were not opposed to the princi-
ple of ending the Slave trade, Southern Senators, however, did not 
believe that the United States should enter an international conference 
to state its position. The United States could use and was using its 
prestige and moral influence to end this traffic. The United States 
had been the first nation to prohibit the trade from all areas of its 
jurisdiction. To enter into an international agreement against the 
slave trade, they argued, was unnecessary. To do so was an unwarranted 
insertion of United States• morality into the domestic affairs of those 
countries still engaged in the trade. 
John Randolph tied the issue of slavery to the abolition of the 
slave trade .. He said that those attempting to abolish the slave trade 
were deceiving the people. Randolph claimed that the true purpose of 
those who sought to end the slave trade was, in reality, the abolition 
of slavery itself. Randolph further declared that supporters of the 
movement were fanatics, who, despite their public speeches, would 
extend the spectre of slave rebellion and abolition throughout the 
caribbean. 13 
Hayne also spoke on this issue in a speech on the Senate floor. 
He pointed out that the United States was the first nation to oppose 
and end the slave trade within its borders. This was sufficient, he 
thought. He did not want the United States to consult with foreign 
governments concerning the slave trade or the recognition of Haiti. 
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These were subjects, he said, which were "not to be discuS,sed anywhere". 
He continued, that, "there is not a nation on the globe with whom I 
would consult on that subject, and least of all the new republics. 1114 
Both Hayne and Randolph considered an attack upon even the periphery of 
the slave question a potentially deadly thrust against Southern 
interests. 
Hugh L. White of Tennessee also believed that American representa-
tion at Panama would be injurious to the best interests of the United 
States. In a speech before the Senate he declared, that the tranquality 
of the Southern and Western slave states would be upset if United States 
envoys discussed any topics concerning slavery at the Panama Congress. 
He also tied the abolition of the slave trade and the Panama Congress to 
domestic slavery. They were, he declared, potentially dangerous issues 
for the entire United States. He envisioned the country being ulti-
mately divided into two camps over the issue of slavery. To avo,id this 
possibility, he stated, all further talks and negotiations concerning 
any aspect of slavery should be terminated. 15 
The Southern position regarding the Panama Congress was closely 
related to its defensiveness over the question of slavery. The Soutn 
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feared that the Panama Congress would ultimately lead to a questioning 
of Southern rights and institutions involving slavery. The Panama 
Congress promised to place the questions of slavery, equality, and 
future relations with black governed countries under intense scrutiny. 
Southern Senators deemed that this scrutiny would be conducted in an 
unfavorable atmosphere. The atmosphere would prejudge all decisions 
and insure unfavorable results for the South. This fear, coupled with 
the predominant Southern attitude that the less said about slavery the 
better, naturally led to Southern opposition. The South wanted to 
ignore the slavery question both at home and in foreign affairs. The 
Panama Congress, threatened to open the question to public debate on an 
international level. This debate would take place where the South 
could neither control the discussion nor the action taken. The South, 
then, was opposed to the whole mission. 
Southern Senators viewed the Panama Congress as a direct attack 
upon the institution of slavery. This, of course, made the Panama 
Congress a threat to the South. It was imperitive for the South to 
repel that attack. Southern peace and security depended upon it. The 
fear of this potential attack by the Panama Congress and the worry that 
Latin American inspired emancipation sentiments would incite slave 
rebellion promoted Southern opposition to the Panama Congress. 
Neither the Senate debates nor the messages of the President 
effectively refuted the Southerners• slavery oriented arguments against 
the Panama mission. Answers were presented for most of the other points 
presented by the opposition. On the subject of slavery, however, none 
were offered. It appears that the proponents of the mission realized 
the threat that the Panama Congress posed to the South. They,too, felt 
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the issue of slavery was best left ignored, if possible. 
To understand properly the antagonism that Southerners had towards 
the Congress of American States, their reasoning must be placed in the 
correct context. When viewed from the time period of the early 1820's, 
Southern objections present a strong argument ;against United States 
representation at Panama. The South predicted the disruption of the 
Union, the formation of pro- and anti-slavery factions in the country, 
slave rebellions and the disruption of the Union as possible conse-
quences of United States' participation in the Panama Congress. With 
the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to see that those fears were 
greatly exaggerated and for the most part unfounded. The Southern 
opposition, however, did not know that the Panama Congress would fail 
to achieve the objectives set for it. To base its judgements the 
Southern opposition had at its disposal only the treaties and letters 
of invitations sent to the United States. Southern arguments based on 
that information was, to them, well-reasoned and logical. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES 
FOREIGN POLICY 
While the slavery issue was a serious sectional obstacle to United 
States' participation in the Panama Congress, there were other reasons 
presented that concerned the nation as a whole. Perhaps the overriding 
concern, certainly one that affected all sections of the United States 
equally, concerned foreign policy. Reservations in this realm were as 
numerous and multifaceted as the issue itself. All were traditional, 
non-political objections applied to all United States foreign policy 
changes. United States' participation in the Panama Congress could 
possibly lead to an undesirable entagling alliance or a serious viola-
tion of United States neutrality. The mission to Panama was a complete 
departure from a 11 the tradi ti'Ona 1 American methods of conducting 
foreign affairs. Participation in the Panama Congress could restrict 
the United States diplomatically. The United States would be forced to 
abide by the dictates of the assembly, and thereby lose its freedom of 
action in international affairs. All of these factors led opponents to 
believe that approving the mission to Panama, as it was then defined, 
was not in the best interests of the United States. 
In 1825-1826 the United States' foreign policy was in a state of 
flux. Two opposing concepts concerning the United States' participation 
in international affairs were debated. One concept was the traditional 
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isolationist policy that George Washington has expressed in his Farewell 
Address. The United States should avoid entangling foreign alliances 
and remain cordial and neutral towards all nations. Briefly stated, 
the concept proposed relations with all,alliances with none. This 
philosophy was popular and was utilized many times by the opposition 
in Congressional debate. The traditionalists argued that isolationism 
had been successful in the past. As a result of that policy, the 
United States was prosperous and at peace. Why then, the opposition 
asked, should the United States change its basic foreign policies in 
favor of new untried ones? The opposition could see no reason to do so. 
The second concept, concerning the United States' foreign po)icy 
was revisionist because it was internationalist in scope. The basic 
premise of this concept was that the United States should participate 
fully in international affairs. This view of American foreign policy 
did not appear in the United States until shortly after the end of the 
War of 1812, when a spirit of nationalism swept the country. This 
spirit unified the country somewhat and the United States looked beyond 
its earlier problems. Looking outward, the United States saw a united 
Europe, free of many of its former jealousies. A united Europe posed 
potential threat to United States security. Looking Southward, the 
United States encountered its sister continent in revolt and turmoil. 
The turmoil in Latin America had drawn the attention of a unified 
Europe. This attention and the resultant designs by an avaricious 
Europe threatened Spanish American and United States' security. 
The new international situation tended to create sympathy for the 
Latin American revolutions and dictated a rethinking of United States• 
foreign policy. At least that is what the adherents of the 
internationalist concept of American foreign policy claimed. Many 
Americans believed that the United States had a vital interest in the 
success of the Latin American revolutions. After all, united Europe 
was a common threat. The belief that a common threat needed a common 
front won support in the United States. 1 
The concept that the United States was vitally affected by the 
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Latin American struggles for independence was strengthened when the 
extent of Europe 1 s involvement in the region was realized. Europe was 
deeply embroiled in the commercial affairs of the new republics. This 
was not a happy circumstance for the United States, which had its own 
designs on the new nations commerce. Confrontations with European 
powers concerning Latin America were, for the next decade, a major 
theme of public discussion in the United States. 2 
President John Q. Adams and Secretary of State, Henry Clay, both 
supported the Latin American independence movements. With these two 
men dominating the direction of American foreign policy, the United 
States could be expected to show a lively interest in the affairs of 
Latin America. Together, these two men assured a friendly interest 
and reception for the Panama Congress in the executive branch of the 
United States• government. Henry Clay saw the Panama Congress as a 
chance to form his 11 American system, 11 a union of the American nations, 
with the United States at its head. This union would be an example of 
the benefits of liberty and democracy, as compared with the despotism 
of autocratic Europe. Clay envisioned the American union as the 
commercial warehouse and trading center of the world. Adams, of course, 
was one of the forces behind the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine and 
he closely cooperated with his Secretary of State in matters concerning 
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Latin America. 3 
In the Congress of the United States, however, the Panama 
Congress was by no means assured of a friendly reception. Traditional-
ists in the Senate such as Martin Van Buren of New York, Hugh L. White 
of Tennessee, Robert Hayne of South Carolina, Levi Woodbury of New 
Hampshire and Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey opposed the Panama 
mission. 4 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report stated that 
the proposed mission was inexpedient and recommended that the United 
States not send representatives to the Panama Conference. 5 Ordinarily 
the Senate would not have been able to rule on the expediency of such 
a mission. In his December 26, 1826, message to the Senate, however, 
the President requested that the Senate do so. 6 
First the opposition had to define the character of the assembly 
and show it to be harmful to United States' interests. Congressional 
opposition furthermore needed to establish the conference as a beliger-
ant assembly. Opponents had to show that the primary reason for calling 
the meeting in the first place was the war with Spain. Opposition 
arguments were hard to refute. The lack of an adequate definition 
concerning the character of the Congress and the failure of the Latin 
; 
American diplomats to answer the Presidents questions concerning format 
and objectives of the Congress made it difficµlt for its proponents to 
depict the conference as a peaceful body. T~e task was made more 
i 
difficult by the language of the individual ttreaties of confederation, 
which created t~e Panama Congress and the letters of invitationextended 
to the United States. All of these documents, opponents claim~d, 
clearly demonstrated the beligerent character of the assembly. The 
opposition claimed that attendance would ally the United States with 
Latin America against Spain. This event would destroy the United 
•. 
States neutral position. 
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Robert Hayne, Senator from South Carolina and leader of the growing 
Southern sectionalist clique in the Senate, told that body that it must 
determine the nature of the Panama Congress before it could establish 
the expediency of sending envoys to that assembly. The Senate could 
not establish the expediency of the mission without knowing how United 
States' attendance at Panama would affect the nation's interests and 
neutrality. The mere presence of United States' representatives at 
Panama would not change the nature of the meeting from belligerent to 
benevolent. Regardless of the instructions to the United States' envoy, 
if the assembly was essentially belligerent, it would remain so. To 
avoid quilt by association with a belligerent assembly, the United 
States had to determine if the meeting in Panama was to be peaceful or 
war like. Hayne said that to make this determination, the Senate had 
to rely on Latin American sources of information. These were the 
same sources, he claimed, that the rest of the world would use to judge 
the intent of the Panama Congress. 7 
Hayne drew his conclusions concerning the assembly from public 
Latin American sources, Bolivar's Circular Letter and the individual 
treaties of confederation. 8 He concluded that the Panama Congress 
would be held to discuss prosecution of the war with Spain. He stated 
that unification and cooperation among the assembled states in raising 
armies and fleets would be a natural result of the international 
gathering. The original purpose of the Panama Congress, Hayne said, 
was the creation of mutual offensive and defensive alliances against 
Spain. These alliances were to be negotiated among the parties at 
Panama and were desi.gned to preserve Latin American independence. 
Hayne believed that the separate treaties had already formed a 
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confederation of Latin American states. The Panama Congress would be 
the assembly of that confederation. This confederation, in Hayne 1 s 
opinion, was clearly an offensive and defensive alliance among the 
members. The Panama Congress, declared Hayne, was clearly an outgrowth 
of those bellicose alliances against Spain. The only reason for holding 
the conference was to force a speedy and successful conclusion of the 
war. Unity would achieve that goal. 9 Hayne said his study of the 
information concerning the Panama Congress forced him to conclude that 
it was belligerent in nature. As such, American participation at the 
assembly threatened the United States• neutrality. 10 
Levi Woodbury, a New Hampshire Senator and a leading opponent of 
the mission to Panama, also thought it important to determine the 
character of the Panama Congress. Woodbury 1 s views are interesting 
because he was a Northern senator. His position helps dispel the con-
tention that opposition to the Panama Congress was strictly sectional 
and Southern. Woodbury believed that the title of congress, as applied 
to the assembly at Panama, was too equivocal. An easy definition of 
the assembly 1 s nature was impossible. He also believed that the 
treaties creating the Panama Congress required further study before 
deciding the true nature of the meeting. 11 
Woodbury stated, however, that the Panama Congress could not be 
described as non-belligerent. The treaties, he claimed, could leave 
no other conclusion. The Spanish Americans, he said, tried to devise 
the Panama Congress to fulfill two separate functions--one peaceful and 
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one bellicose. As a result,·he said, there was too much confusion. 
While it was easy to see the peaceful functions of the conference, its 
belligerent nature was equally clear. 12 
Martin Van Buren also fought the proposed mission in the Senate. 
His speech represented an eloquent plea for isolationism~ 3 Van Buren 
did not oppose sending representatives to the meeting, but he did 
oppose official representation. The Panama Congress, he said, was 
formed by the individual treaties of confederation among the several 
Latin American states. Van Buren argued that since the United States 
was not an official party to those agreements, it did not have to be 
officially represented at Panama. The United States could attend 
unofficially either by sending an executive agent or one of the United 
States• ministers already in the area. 
Unofficial attendance, Van Buren asserted, would allow the United 
States the advantages of being represented, yet would avoid the pitfalls 
of an offical presence. Van Buren believed that the existing organiza-
tion of the Panama Congress and the proposed form of United States• 
representation there was a dangerous mixture. As the two were then 
formulated, Van Buren could not consider the mission as expedient or 
in the best interests of the United States. 14 
Van Buren believed the Senate had insufficient information at its 
disposal to approve the United States• representation at the congress. 
This lack of information was the fault of Mr. Adams, who had waived 
his own stipulations for accepting the invitation. 15 Van Buren said 
that he opposed all armed alliances, all armed confederacies, or confed-
erations of any sort. 16 He opposed the United States participation at 
Panama because he thought the United States would be expected to join 
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11 . 17 an a iance. 
The opposition continually stressed that the United States was 
being asked to send ministers to Panama, but as yet no one knew what 
was to be done there. The Congressional opposition argued that without 
knowing what would be done at Panama or what our ministers were expected 
to do there, the Senate could not determine the expediency of the 
mission. Nor could the Senate assume, asserted the opposition, that all 
the aspects of the conference would be to the best interest of the 
United States. 
The Panama Congress, said the opponents of the mission, was an 
organization of states involved in a war with Spain. The treaties and 
letters of invitation to the United States, expressed a desire for 
mutual alliances to resist European intervention. Indeed, the separate 
treaties of confederation between the several Latin American nations 
,. 
were defensive alliances. In his "Circular Letter," Bolivar had called 
for an alliance. Other Latin American literature on the congress did 
the same thing. The Panama Congress was conceived by wartime tensions, 
convened by a wartime alliance and intended to serve as a council of 
war. It was impossible, therefore, to view the Panama Congress as 
anything but belligerent. 
After labeling the Panama Congress as a bellicose assembly of 
wartime allies, the opposition moved to attack the proposed United 
States attendance at the conference. According to Congressional 
opponents, attending the conference and associating intimately with 
belligerent nations would violate the precepts of Washington's Farewell 
Address. Participation at Panama would also violate United States 
neutrality and deviate from the traditional foreign policy of the United 
States. Association with belligerents at Panama would be tantamount 
to alliance with them. Whether the United States signed an agreement 
or not, in the eyes of the world, the nation would have placed itself 
on the side of the embattled republics. This association would most 
definitely constitute an entangling alliance, committing the United 
States to the existing conflict as well as any future European inter-
vention. The destruction of United States neutrality was something 
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that not even proponents of the mission wanted. Attendance at Panama 
was also a deviation from past policy. Congressional opponents declared 
that the United States had never been a member of an international 
congress. This country had preferred to negotiate all treaties and 
agreements on a one to one basis and Congressional opponents sought to 
maintain that practice. 
In the early 1800 1s, the United States was not prepared to become 
embroiled in the conflicts with Europe. Neutrality not only formed an 
essential part of national policy but also insured national survival. 
Washington had realized this when he advised neutrality in 1793. The 
United States was not yet ready to challenge the military might of 
Europe. 
The opponents to the United States' representation at Panama 
reasoned that if the conference was belligerent, the United States 
could not join the assembly without destroying its own neutrality. 18 
Woodbury of New Hampshire suggested that the United States wait until 
peace was established and then engage in discussions of a peaceful 
nature. 19 Hayne told the Senate that the treaties plainly called for 
a confederation and mutual offensive and defensive alliances. He called 
the Panama Congress a body of wartime allies, convened for the purpose 
of bringing the conflict to a quick and successful termination. 
Supporting his contention, Hayne noted that Chile and Colombia had 
bound themselves in an alliance to preserve Spanish American inde-
pendence. All the other individual treaties of confederation said 
basically the same thing, he said. 20 
Hayne claimed that international law made no distinction between 
supporting a belligerent in council or aiding it in action. Either 
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of these actions forfeited a nation's neutrality. The Panama Congress 
was a belligerent council; its purpose was to discuss matters pertaining 
to the war. To attend the Panama Congress and to discuss matters 
connected with the war in progress, would leave other nations no choice 
but to consider the United States an ally of the Latin American repub-
lics. In Hayne's opinion, the claim that our delegates would not 
discuss belligerent matters was not sufficient protection for our 
neutrality. The United States could not excuse itself, Hayne continued, 
simply by saying that its intentions were purely peaceful. 21 
Hayne pointed out that the United States had been told that it 
would not jeapordize its neutral position by participating in the 
conference. The same communication, however, listed topics of discus-
sion that would force the United States to do just that. Hayne drew 
the Senate's attention to the Canaz Letter, which called for the infor-
mation of an American union to counter the Holy Alliance. That was the 
kind of alliance Latin Americans expected the United States to join at 
Panama. Mere participation in discussions of this nature would destroy 
the United States' neutral position. 22 
Congressional opponents claimed that United States participation 
at Panama would jeapordize its position as an impartial arbitrator. 
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Variious nations had sought and respected the United States' advice 
concerning the issue of war and peace. Being neutral left all diplo~ 
matic avenues open and allowed the United States to work with all 
nations for the cause of peace. The United States would lose its 
position as an arbitrator if it became allied with Latin America or 
even presented th9t image to the international community by participat-
ing in the Panama Congress. 
Many members of the opposition questioned the wisdom of such a 
radical departure from traditional United States' policy. Levi 
Woodbury claimed that it was not possible for the United States to send 
official representative to an organization or state before it existed.23 
John Holmes, a senator from Maine, viewed participation in an inter-
national treaty-making body as a novel and dangerous step. 24 Berrien 
from Georgia told the Senate that attendance at the Panama Congress 
would injure the best interests of the United States. By associating 
itself with this foreign body, Berrien stated, the United States tied 
its destiny to that of the confederation. He firmly opposed deviation 
from past policies which had served the United States so well. 25 
A major fear of Congressional opponents was that the United States 
would lose its freedom of action in international affairs by partici-
pating in the Panama Congress. A good example of this potential 
restriction, they insisted, was the matter of Haitian recognition. The 
Panama Congress was expected to make a decision concerning the future 
relations between the assembled nations and the island republic. The 
opposition insisted that United States' diplomatic relations with other 
countires would be decided by majority vote in this foreign assembly. 
Congressional opponents also contended that a member of the Panama 
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Congress, the United States would be committed to abide by the rulings 
of that assembly, whether or not the results were in the best interests 
of the country. 
,. 
In one respect, the opposition's position was correct. Bolivar's 
original concept of the Panama Congress was that of a confederation of 
nations which would surrender their authority in foreign affairs, while 
maintaining internal autonomy. This would provide a united front in 
international affairs, yet leave each nation sovereign in local matters. 
Full participation in the assembly would have deprived the United States 
of its freedom of action in foreign relations. The opponents point that 
participation in the Panama Congress would have impaired United States' 
neutrality is also well taken. The treaties of confederation did create 
a wartime alliance against Spain. The Panama Congress was created to 
serve as the ruling and policy making assembly of that wartime confed-
eration. Intimate association with such a belligerent partnership would 
surely have cast serious doubt upon the sincerity of a United States' 
neutrality. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE LEGAL QUESTION. 
The last major congressional objection to United States participa-
tion at the Panama Congress concerned the legality of the proposed 
mission. This was another objection devoid of political controversy. 
Basing their arguments on the Constitution and international law 
opponents sought to convince the Senate that the proposed delegation 
was illegal. Discussions involving the legality of the proposed mission 
were divided into two major arguments. One argument declared that the 
mission itself was unconstitutional. The second argument concerned 
procedure. The entire matter, however, involved legislative and 
executive rights and privileges, especially those concerning federal 
appointments and the creation of federal positions. 
On December 26, 1825, President John Q. Adams officially placed 
the question of United States• representation at the Panama Congress 
before the Senate. In the presidential message that accompanied his 
request for Senate action, Adams made several controversial assertions. 
The President claimed, as his right under the Constitution, the power 
to accept the invitations and promise United States• attendance at the 
Panama Congress without consulting with the Senate. In the same message 
Adams also nominated two men for the position of Minister Plenipotentiary 
to the Panama Congress. The Senate judged these statements and actions 
as unconstitutional. In addition, many senators believed that Adams was 
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attempting to usurp Congressional rights and privileges. 
The Senate was especially offended by Adams• attempt to nominate 
and send ministers to the Panama Congress without first consulting 
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with the Senate. The opposition stated that Adams had a constitutional 
duty to seek Senate advice and consent concerning Presidential appoint-
ments. To do otherwise was a blatant attempt to extend executive 
authority illegally. 
Senate opponents further claimed that the presidential appointment 
of ministers to the Panama Congress actually constituted the creation 
of new federal positions. The opposition declared that the President 
did not have the power to create new posts. The constitution provided 
only two ways to establish new offices. First, the Constitution itself 
provided for several posts. Secondly, a new job could be created by 
a law which had been passed by both houses of Congress and signed by 
the President. 
The argument as to whether the Panama appointments constituted 
the creation of new jobs was significant. If the appointments had 
been made to fill legitimate vacancies, then the President had the 
power, during the Senate recess, to appoint temporary replacements. If, 
however, the appointments were being made to a nonexistant office, as 
the opposition claimed, then the Congress had to create those positions 
before they could be filled. Otherwise the appointments wereunconstitu-
tional. Concerning the Panama mission, Senate opponents held the 
position that there were no existing posts to be filled. The Senate 
could not approve the nominations until it first created the offices. 
It would not approve officials to fill offices created by the President. 
Opponents asserted that Adams was attempting to establish a precedent 
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that would allow the President to create new posts and nominate men to 
fill them without consulting the Senate. The whole matter of sending 
delegates to Panama, then, was nothing less than an attempt by Adams 
to monopolize the government. 
The second argument concerning procedure was employed as a delaying 
tactic. The President had claimed the power to bypass the Senate in 
the the appointment of ministers to Panama. Adams declared that he had 
submitted the question to the Congress only because he felt such an 
important matter should have Congressional concurrence. According to 
Adams, he was placing the issue before the Congress out of personal 
choice, not constitutional obligation. 2 
The Senate would not accept this affront. The Senate had to 
challenge Adams' assertion of executive perogitive to preserve, for the 
future, its rights and perogitives. The right to create Federal posi-
tions, appoint officers, and committ foreign policy was highly import-
ant. It would be dangerous and unacceptable to the Senate to allow 
this power to be concentrated soley in the executive. 
In his message to the Senate, Adams had declared that the invita-
tion had been offered and that he had already accepted. He, therefore, 
asked the Senate to rule on the expediency of the proposed mission. 3 
According to opponents of the mission, he had presented the Senate with 
the choice of surrendering Congressional perogatives by approving the/ 
delegation or embarassing the President by refusing to do so. This 
placed the Senate in a delicate position. In its report, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee noted its sense of embarassment. At first 
glance, the President's message had left the members with the impression 
that there was nothing left to which it could advice or consent. 
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Adams' message clearly stated that he had accepted the invitations. 
Adams' referral of the question to the Senate appeared to be a mere 
concession to Senate vanity. After reading the correspondence concern-
ing the invitation, however, the committee determined that Adams 
intended no final action until the Senate had approved the mission. 
The co11111ittee decided,therefore, to give the entire matter its fullest 
•ct t' 4 cons1 era ion. 
Many Senators criticized Adams' encroachments on Senate perogatives 
and challenged the legality of sending ministers to Panama. This sus-
pected usurpation of Senate rights created further animosity between 
the President and the Congress. Littleton Tazewell staunchly supported 
the Senate's perogatives. Tazewell argued that the President must 
obtain Senate advice and consent for appointments to diplomatic posts. 
Tazewell declared that the President was trying to arrogate to the 
executive branch exclusive power to make appointments to the foreign 
service. Adams, indeed, was attempting to circumvent constitutional or 
Congressional limitations on the actions of the executive. 5 Tazewell 
asserted that if the President received the authority to create new 
positions, then the total power of the federal government would reside 
in the executive branch. 6 
Tazewell agreed that the President had the constituti ona 1 authority 
to fill existing vacancies, after consuling with the Senate. Adams 
did not, however, have the power to create a new office. New positions 
were not created by Presidential appointment. Nothing in the constitu-
tion, noted Tazewell, gave the President any power to do so. No 
position could exist until the Congress created it. The President 
could not appoint a minister to a nonexistant office. The right of 
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the Senate to give advice and consent to the President concerning 
appointments to diplomatic posts was a check on executive power. The 
President could make temporary appointments to fill an existing vacancy 
without the Senate's consent only if Congress was in recess. No new 
positions could be created, however, if the Congress was not in session. 
Tazewell conceeded that Congress sometimes created federal jobs at the 
request of the President. But he insisted that Congress created the 
position and Congress drafted the job description. 7 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report also discussed 
executive encroachment upon Senate perogatives. Usually, the report 
stated, the Senate did not have the right to examine the ultimate pur-
pose of a proposed office. In most instances, the objects to be 
achieved were already stated such as in the case in filling an existing 
vacancy or consenting to send ministers to new sovereign nations. 
Since the objectives were established by preexisting laws or job 
descriptions, the Senate merely concerned itself with the fitness of 
the nominee. The proposed mission to Panama was an entirely different 
situation. The Senate had been asked to approve the unorthodox creation 
of a new diplomatic post. 
In addition, Congressional opponents claimed that the President 
erred in his timing. Before Adams sent his nominations to the Senate 
for approval, he should have asked the Senate to create the post. The 
Senate could legally receive nominations to nonexistent offices. Until 
the positions were created by Congressional statute, the United States 
could not legally send ministers to the Panama Congress. 
The opposition resorted to this discussion of procedure because 
it needed an excuse to examine and rule on the expediency of the 
proposed mission. Without justifying its investigations, the opposi-
tion could not legitimately defend their actions. In usual practice, 
the Senate seldom considered the expediency of a proposed diplomatic 
mission, it merely concerned itself with the fitness of the nominee. 
In the case of the Panama Congress, however, the opposition exploited 
procedural irregularities to present its objections and block the 
proposed mission. 
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The opposition raised several constitutional objections to United 
States participation at the Panama Congress. Levi Woodbury, of New 
Hampshire noted that the Latin American treaties of "perpetual union, 
league, and confederation" had created the Panama Congress. As a 
result, he continued, the United States was being asked to send minis-
ters to a permanent organization. 8 He stated, however, that the United 
States could not legally join a permanent body. Attendance at and 
membership in any permanent assembly, except the Union of the United 
States itself, was unconstitutional. The Panama Congress, he added, 
was both perpetual and judicial in nature. The conference was 
intended to mediate difficulties and interpret treaties. American 
membership would thus subject the United States to the jurisdiction of 
a power other than its own constitution. This of course, was also 
unconstitutional. 9 
An examination of the United States Constitution reveals that 
Woodbury was correct. Article VI, section 2 of the Constitution 
establishes that document as the supreme law of the land. Woodbury 
contended that neither the Constitution nor any existing laws or 
treaties authorized the United States to mingle its destiny with that 
of other nations. If the United States joined the Panama Congress, it 
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would violate the supremacy of the constitution, since joining the 
Panama Congress would palce the Constitution in a secondary position. 
This was because dictates of the conference would take precedence over 
the domestic provisions of the Constitution of the United States. 10 
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri agreed with Woodbury that the 
proposed mission was unconstitutional. Benton based his beliefs, 
however, on international law and the issue of national sovereignty. 
Benton informed the Senate that diplomatic missions were ranked in 
international law. Each class of mission had particular objectives 
and responsibilities. One stipulation was that official national 
representatives could be exchanged only between sovereign entities. 11 
The Panama Congress, Benton claimed, was not a sovereign assembly. 
The sovereignty of the individual assembled nations was not vested in 
the Panama Congress. The constitution according to Benton, did not 
permit official United States representation in non-sovereign organiza-
tions. The fact that the Panama Congress was a non-sovereign assembly 
made official United States representation at the conference unconsti-
tutiona 1. 
The opposition further charged that the Panama Congress was not 
a legally constituted assembly. Under international law, an assembly 
or nation had to be sovereign to legally exist. Since no sovereignty 
was placed in the Panama Congress, it did not legally exist under inter-
national law. Thus, the opposition claimed, the Panama Congress was 
an outlaw body. Its existence was not recognized by international law 
or by any nation in the world except the Latin American participants. 
The United States could not send official representatives to a confer-
ence that did not legally exist. Opponents argued, therefore, that 
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not only would attendance violate the tenents of the constitution, but 
it would also violate international law. 12 
Martin Van Buren doubted that the Panama Congress was solely a 
diplomatic conference. Despite what the Senate had been told, Van 
Buren believed that the conference would also assume legislative and 
judicial functions. If the true character of the conference was 
legislative and judicial, Van Buren asserted, then United States' 
attendance was again unconstitutional. To support his contention, Van 
Buren noted the special immunities granted envoys to the conference. 
Van Buren claimed that if the Panama Congress was truly diplomatic, the 
envoys did not need special grants of immunities. Immunity was a matter 
of course if the nature of the conference was purely diplomatic. 13 
Thomas H. Benton agreed with Van Buren on this point. He was 
convinced that the Panama Congress was more than a diplomatic assembly. 
He denounced as a sham the title of "minister" when applied to the 
envoys to Panama. The proper title for the delegates, he said, was 
Deputy. Deputy was a proper choice because that was the title given 
to legislative representatives to foreign congresses. 14 
Benton told the Senate that the type of representation Adam's con-
-· 
templated failed all known tests of international law. The commission-
ers would not carry letters of credence. Delegates were not being 
sent to a sovereign assembly. The envoys would not possess any form 
of diplomatic protection, nor was the United States a party to any of 
the treaties that promised protection for the delegates. 16 
Benton believed that the Panama Congress was a legislative body. 
He declared that the purpose of the assembly was to guide and govern the 
Latin American confederation. His contention was correct. The treaties 
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of confederation, stated as much. Because the Panama Congress was 
legislative as well as diplomatic, Benton noted that the representatives 
would need special grants of immunity, diplomats would not. 16 
In the debates, the Congressional opposition did not limit itself 
to negative arguments. Opponents made counter proposals that were 
intended to avoid the difficulties presented by the type of envoys 
Adams had suggested. Some Senators suggested the use of special 
government agents as representatives to Panama. Other Senators 
suggested that one of the United States ministers to Latin America 
could attend the conference in an informal capacity. Unofficial 
representation would neither jeopardize United States neutrality nor 
violate the Constitution. Informal representation would also free the 
United States from any agreements to recognize Haiti or abolish slavery. 
To the opposition, therefore, the presence of unofficial American envoys 
at Panama did not present the frightening aspect that official repre-
sentation did. 
Martin Van Buren stressed that he did not oppose American presence 
at Panama. He did oppose, however, official representation. He 
favored either the utilization of executive agents or United States 
ministers already in Latin America. He preferred either of these two 
options because they were constitutional and they did not violate the 
United States neutral stance. 17 
Precedents existed for the employment of unofficial representatives 
in the conduct of American diplomacy. George Washington had used 
private agents to handle special or confidential matters. John Jay 
mentioned the possible utilization of special agents in the Federalists 
Papers. 18 The United States had sent executive agents to Latin America 
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in 1810. President James Madison had dispatched William Sh~ler to 
Vera Cruz, Mexico, to observe the developing Mexican Revolutionary 
situation. 19 Executive agents had been frequently sent to new states 
before the United States granted official recognition. The use of 
private agents also removed the need for official diplomatic recogni-
tion. Agents could serve as listening posts and maintain the needed 
relations as well as an ambassador or minister. But, while the 1atter 
two officials required full diplomatic recognition, the agent did 
not. To many Senators, unofficial agents were the ideal instrument to 
conduct friendly, but informal diplomatic ~elations. 20 
The United States had also dispatched executive agents to inter-
national conferences. James Monroe, while President, had initiated 
this practice, by sending Alexander McRae 'to Europe to attend any 
international conference arising from European interest in Latin 
America. McRae 1 s example, however, offered no real precedent for the 
Panama Congress. McRae had been employed as a spy and had kept his 
governmental connections secret. 21 
The use of executive agents, as suggested by Van Buren, would 
certainly have facilitated the United States 1 s representation at 
Panama. At the least, Adams could have saved a great deal of time and 
trouble. Unofficial executive agents would not have required Senate 
approva1. 22 This proceedure would have eliminated the entire debate. 
Since it fell within the authority of the President to name informal 
agents without congressional approval, all objections against the United 
States' attendance would have been demolished. And the expected bene-
fits of the mission could have been gained. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The United States• Congress debated the question of American 
attendance at the Panama Congress for four months. When the debate 
finally ended, the Senate authorized two ministers to go to Panama. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, which had labeled the 
mission as inexpedient and had recommended that the United States not 
attend the conference, was rejected by a vote of 24-19. 1 Richard C. 
Anderson, United States minister of Colombia, was confirmed as one of 
the delegates by a vote of 27-17. John Sargent, although highly unpop-
ular with the South, was approved 26-18 on April 12, 1826. 2 The 
House of Representatives approved the funding of $40,000 for the 
mission on April 22, 1826, by a vote of 134-60. 3 On May 2, 1826, the 
Senate concurred 23-19. 4 With this final vote, by the Senate, on the 
appropriations for the mission, the United States Congress• role in 
the affair terminated. 
On June 12, 1826, Richard C. Anderson departed for Panama from 
his post in Bogota, Colombia, but enroute to the conference, he 
contracted a fever and died. 5 There is a minor controversy as to 
whether John Sargent left the United States before or after the Panama 
Congress adjourned. All sources agree, however, that Sargent never 
arrived at the Isthmus. He did go to Tacubaya, Mexico, however, where 
he joined the delegates awaiting the reconvening of the conference. 
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The Panama Congress did not reconvene. After several months, Sargent 
asked to be relieved of his commission. He was replaced by Joel R. 
Poinsett, who was already serving in Mexico as the United States 
minister to that country. In short, the United States mission to 
Panama was a disappointment. 
The conference, however, was an even greater disappointment. 
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Delegates at Panama wrangled through twenty-three days and ten sessions. 
The conference adjourned on July 15, 1826, and never reassembled. 
Except for Colombia, none of the nations ever ratified any of the tena-
tive agreements reached at Panama. By the time the conference actually 
opened on June 22, 1826, the threats and pressures that had led to its 
creation had subsided. With outside pressures diminishing, the 
countries quickly fell to bickering and fighting among themselves. 
~ ~ 
Even Simon Bolivar, originator of the conference, was disappointed at 
its miniscule results. 6 
In the United States Congress, neither the proponents nor the 
opponents of the mission emerged victorious. The opposition had 
certainly lost. Ministers had been approved and the United States had 
intended to be officially represented at the conference. Yet Adams, 
Clay, and their supporters had not won either. The four-month congres-
sional battle had only served to antagonize the legislative branch of 
the government, and opposition to Adams' administration intensified. 
He emerged from the battle with virtually nothing to show for his 
staunch support of the mission. Since the United States envoys did not 
attend the conference, America's voice was not heard. 
Viewed from the vantage of hindsight, many of the opposition's 
arguments do seem extreme. The fact that the Panama Congress was such 
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a fiasco makes it difficult to sympathize with the opposition's 
position. Congressional opponents, however, could not foresee the 
events in Panama as they prepared their arguments against the mission. 
They could only utilize existing documents, pronouncements of the Latin 
Americans, and statements of the Executive branch to formulate their 
position. These statements and pronouncements, until proven false, had 
to be taken at face value. One could not safely assume that the Panama 
Conference would not live up to expectations. The opponents of the 
mission were forced to base their conclusions on what they expected 
from the conference, not onwhat it actually became. 
To understand the opponents, one must view their arguments in 
the proper context. What was true in the first quarter of 1826 was not 
true later. Once the Panama Congress had adjourned, it was easy to 
see the useless extremity of the opposition's arguments. But in early 
1826, the opponents and the proponents were working on mere conjecture. 
The initial endeavor of this study was to divorce the controversy 
surrounding the Presidential election of 1824 from the Panama Congress. 
This goal proved to be impossible. The political animosity arising 
from the feuds of the day affected all political issues. The major 
purpose of this study, however, was to demonstrate that the political 
feud of 1824 was not the only, or even the primary, reason for the 
opposition to American representation at the Panama Conference. It is 
the contention of this study that opposition would have arisen with or 
without the residual political feud of the 1824 election. 
Neutrality and the security of the United States were essential 
for the continued prosperity of the country. American neutrality and 
prosperity would have been threatened if for any reason the European 
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powers believed that the United States was aligned with the Latin 
American nations. The Congressional opposition considered the Panama 
Congress an assembly of belligerents which had convened to perform 
bellicose functions. A secret alliance had been proposed to ally North 
and South America in common cause against Europe. The Congressional 
opposition interpreted this proposed alliance as a necessary function 
of the conference, and the formation of such an alliance had been 
listed as a provision in all the treaties that created the Panama 
Congress. The peace and tranquility of the United States would have 
been jeopardized by such an alliance. If the United States had joined 
with the Latin American states, it would have surrendered its destiny 
to the whims of Europe. Any European invasion of Latin America would 
have committed the United States, as a member of the alliance, to go 
to war. 
The South would have opposed United States' representation at 
Panama, regardless of who was President at the time. The South was 
just beginning to form its own sectional party. This same party would 
have opposed any President on any issue it construed as prejudicial to 
Southern interests. 
The South also feared the possible consequences of any discussion 
of slavery at Panama. Southern opposition viewed with alarm the 
possibility of an international discussion of slavery and the rights 
of slave owners. The proposed talks concerning the abolition of the 
African slave trade threatened to evolve into such a discussion. The 
Southern opponents of the Panama mission ~tated that no representative 
to a domestic assembly could question Southern rights in regards to 
slavery. They asserted, therefore, that there was no justification, 
legal or otherwise, to send representatives to discuss slavery at a 
foreign congress. 
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The question of diplomatic recognition for the island of Haiti, 
another proposed topic at Panama, also raised Southern fears. Examples 
of successful slave rebellions had to be hidden from the slave popula-
tions of the United States. Such examples, southern congressmen feared, 
would prompt slave revolts in the South. Southerners, then, could not 
allow diplomatic recognition of Haiti. The South feared recognition 
would be forced on the United States at Panama. 
Congressional opponents also presented constitutional objections 
to United States attendance at Panama. The Constitution made no 
provision for the United States to become a member of any other 
assembly or union or to place itself under the jurisdiction of that 
body. The Constitution was clearly the supreme law of the United 
States. Placing the United States under any other authority was a 
violation of the Constitution. Thus, the United States could not 
attend the Panama conference without violating its own charter. 
Regardless of the political feud of 1824, constitutional opposition 
would have arisen over Adams manner of presenting the issue. Adams 
blatantly claimed the power to appoint diplomats without consulting 
the Senate. This assured anger and resentment in the Senate. It was 
also a sure method to elicit charges that the President was attempting 
to circumvent the Constitution. 
The question of whether there was in fact a position for the 
Senate to fill and who could create posts in the federal government 
probably would have been debated in any case. The Senate was too 
jealous of its perogitives to allow such executive actions to go 
unchallenged. 
The Panama Congress, therefore, was the type of issue that would 
have aroused opposition no matter who was President. The proposal to 
send ministers plenipotentiary to an international conference was a 
drastic departure from the traditional foreign policy of the United 
States. The proposed change in this instance, threatened the much 
valued neutrality of the country. 
84 
Any one of the above factors should have been serious enough to 
force the cancellation of the mission. The United States, however, 
was enthralled by the romance and nobility of the Latin American cause. 
The Latin Americans were, in the eyes of many people in the United 
States, recreating the American Revolution of 1776 against the tyranny 
and despotism of Europe. The United States also envisioned itself at 
the head of a glorious "American System, 11 though which the "United 
Americas" would reap the benefits of world peace and commerce. The 
fulfillment of this vision demanded that the United States attend the 
conference. Perhaps it is fortunate for the United States that the 
Panama Congress was a failure. Many of the fears expressed by the 
Congressional opponents to the United States• representation at Panama 
were realized in the final decisions of the conference. Just because 
these decisions were never implemented does not alter the fact. It is 
possible that the dire predictions of the opposition could have come 
true. The consequences of that occurence would have been lamentable. 
It should have been enough to keep the United States at home. 
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APPENDIX 
TREATY OF CONFEDERATION BETWEEN 
COLOMBIA ANb CHILI) 
Translation. 
Francisco de Paula Santander, of the Liberators of Venezuela and 
Cundinamarca, decorated with the cross of Boyaca, General of 
Division of the Armies of Colombia, Vice President of the 
Republic, charged with the Executive power, &c. &c. &c. 
To all who shall see these presents, greeting: 
Whereas there has been concluded and signed, in the City of 
Santiago de Chile, on the twenty-first day of October, in the year of 
Grace one thousand eight hundred and twenty-two, between the Republic 
of Colombia and:the State of Chile, by means of Plenipotentiaries 
sufficiently authorized by both parties, a treaty of perpetual union, 
league, and confederation, the tenor whereof is, word for word, as 
follows: 
In the name of God, the Author and Legislator of the Universe: The 
Government of the Republic of Colombia, on the one part, and on the 
other that of the State of Chile, animated with the most sincere desire 
of putting a speedy termination to the calamities of the present war, to 
which they have been incited by the Government of His Catholic Majesty, 
the King of Spain, by effectually co-operating, for so important an 
object, with all their influence, resourGes, and forces, by sea and 
land, to secure forever to their respective people, subjects, and 
citizens, the previous enjoyments of their· internal tranquility, of 
their liberty and national independence: and his execellency the 
Liberator, President of Colombia, having, for that purpose, conferred 
full powers upon the honorable Joaquin Mosquera and Arbolida, member 
of the Senate of the;! Republic of the same name; and his excellency the 
Supreme director of the State of Chile, upon his Ministers of State in 
the Departments of Government and Foreign Relations, D. Joaquin de 
1u. S. Congress, Senate, Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the 
1Jnited States on the Subject of the Mission to the Congress at Panama, 
Together with the Messages and Documents Relating thereto, S. Doc., 68, 
19th Cong., 1st, sess., 1825-1826, pp.17-20. 
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, , , 
Echeverria, and in those of Finance and War, D. Jose Antonio Rodriguez; . 
they after having exchanged, in good and due form the said powers, have 
agreed on the following articles: 
ARTICLE 1. The Republics of Colombia and the State of Chile are 
united, bound, and confederated, in peace and war, to maintain with 
their influences and forces, by sea and land, as far as circumstances 
permit, their independence of the Spanish nc1tion, and of any other 
foreign domination whatsoever~.and to secure, after that is recognized, 
their mutual prosperity, the greatest harmony .and. good un.der.stand.ing, 
as well between their people, s.ubje.cts, and cit.iz.ens, as .. w.ith other. 
Powers with which they may enter into relations. 
ARTICLE 2. The Republic of Colombia and the State of Chile, 
therefore, voluntarily promise and contract a league of close alliance 
and firm and constant friendship, for the common defense, for the 
security of their independence and liberty, for their reciprocal and 
general good, for their internal tranquility, obliging themselves to 
succor each other, and to repel, in common, every attack or invasion 
which may, in any manner, threaten their political existence. 
ARTICLE 3. In order to contribute to the objects pointed out in 
the foregoing articles, the Republic of Colombia binds itself to assist, 
with the disposable sea and land forces, of which the number, or its 
equivalent, shall be fixed at a meeting of Plenipotentiaries. 
ARTICLE 4. · The State of Chile shall also contribute, with the 
disposable sea and land forces, of which the number, or its equivalent, 
shall be likewise fiKed at the said meeting. 
ARTICLE 5. In cases of sudden invasion, both parties shall be 
empowered to act in a hostile manner in the territories of the depend-
ence of either, whenever circumstances of moment prevent their acting 
in concert with the Government to which the sovereignty of the invaded 
territory belongs. But the party so acting shall fulfill, and cause to 
be fulfilled, the statutes, ordinances, and laws, of the respective 
States, so far as circumstances permit, and cause its Government to be 
respected and obeyed. The expenses which shall be incurred in these 
operations and others which may be incurred in consequence of the third 
and fourth articles, shall be liquidated by separate Conventions, and 
shall be made good one year after the conclusion of the present war. 
ARTICLE 6; To secure and perpetuate, in the best mode possible, 
the good friendship and correspondence between both states, they shall 
have free entrance and departure in their ports and territories, and 
shall enjoy there all the civil rights and privileges of trade and 
commerce, being subjected only to the duties, imposts, and restrictions, 
to which the subjects and citizens of each of the contracting parties 
shall be subject. 
ARTICLE 7. In virtue hereof, the vessels and territorial produc-
tions of each of the contracting parties shall pay no higher duties of 
importation, exportation, anchorage, and tonnage, than those established, 
or to be established, for those of the Nation in the ports of each Stat~ 
according to the existing laws; that is to say, that the vessels and· 
productions of Colombia shall pay the duties of entering and departure 
in the ports of the State of Chile as Chileans,and those of the state 
of the state of Chile as Colombians in those of Colombia. · 
ARTICLE 8. Both contracting parties oblige themselves to furnish 
what assistance may be in their power to the ships of war and merchant 
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vessels that may come to the ports belonging to them on account of 
damage or f;or any other cause and as such they sha 11 be empowered to 
careen, repair, provision, arm, augment their armament and their crews, 
so as to enable them to continue their voyages or cruises at the 
expense of the state or individual to whom they belong. 
ARTICLE 9. In order to avoid the, scandalous abuses which may be 
caused by privateers armed on account of individuals to the injury of 
the national commerce, and neutrals, both parties ,a,gree in extending 
the jurisdi~tion of their maritime courts to the privateers which sail 
under the flags of either, and their prizes indiscriminately, whenever 
they are unable to sail easily to the ports of their.d.estination, or 
when there. are appearances .. of th.eir having committed excesses against 
the commerce of neutral nations, with whom both sides are desirous of 
cultivating the greatest harmony and good understanding. 
ARTICLE 10. If by misfortune the internal tranquility be disturbed 
in any part of the states mentioned, by men turbulent, seditious, and 
enemies of the governments lawfully constituted by the voice of the 
people, freely, quietly, and peaceably expressed in virtue of their 
laws, both parties solemnly and formally bind themselves to make common 
cause against them, assisting each.other with whatever means are.in 
their power.,. till they obta.i.n the. re-.establ i shment of or,der .. and. .the .. 
empire of their laws. 
ARTICLE 11. If any person guilty, or accused of treason, sedition, 
or other grievous crimes, flee from justice and be found in the terri-
tory of any of the states mentioned, he shall be delivered up and sent 
back at the disposal of the government which has cognizance of the 
crime, and in whose juri~diction he ought to be tried, as soon as the 
offended party has made his claim in form. Deserters from the national 
armies and marine of either party are also comprehended in this article. 
ARTICLE 12. To draw more closely the bonds which ought in future 
to unite both states, and to remove any difficulty which may present 
itself, or interrupt in any manner their good correspondence and har-
mony, an assembly shall be formed composed of two plenipotentiari'es for 
each party, in the same terms, and with the same formalities, which, 
in conformity to establish usages, ought to be observed, for the 
appointment of ministers of equal class near the governments of foreign 
nations. 
ARTICLE 13. Both parties oblige themselves to interpose their 
good offices with the governments of the other states of America, 
formerly Spanish, to enter into this compact of union, league, and 
confederation. 
ARTICLE 14. As soon as this great and important object has been 
attained, a general assembly of the American states shall be convened, 
composed of their plenipotentiaries, with the charge of cementing, in 
the most solid and stable manner the intimate relations which ought to 
exist between all and everyone of them, and who may serve as a council 
in the great conflicts, as a rallying point in the common dangers, as 
a faithful interpreter of their public treaties when difficulties occur, 
and as an umpire and conciliator in their disputes and differences. 
ARTICLE 15. The republic of Colombia and the state of Chile bind 
themselv.e.s cheerfully to afford to the plenipotentiaries who may compose 
the assembly of the American states, all the aids which hospitality 
among brptherly people, and the sacred and inviolable character of 
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their persons demand, .. whenever the ple.nipotentiaries.shall choose their 
pl ace of meeting in any part of the .. terri tary of Colombia .or that of 
Chile. 
ARTICLE 16. The compact of union, league~ and confederation, 
shall in no wise interrupt the exercise of the national sovereignty 
of each of the contracting parties, as well as to what regards their 
laws and the establishment and form of their respective governments, 
as to what regards their relationship with other foreign nations. But 
they expressly and irrevocably bind themselves not to yield to the 
demands of indemnifications, tributes, or exactions, which the Spanish 
government may bring for the loss of her ancient supremacy over these 
countries, or any other nation whatever in her name and stead, nor.· 
enter into any treaty with Spain, or any other nation,. to the prejudice. 
and diminution of this independence, maintaining on all occasions and 
in all places, their reciprocal interests, with the dignity and energy 
of nations free, independent, friendly, brotherly, and confederated. 
ARTICLE 17. This treaty, or convention ,of amity, league,. and 
confederation shall be ratified withi.n the third day.by.the government 
of the state of Chile, wi.th.the advi .. ce af .. the honorable National 
Convention, in conformity to article 4th, chapter sd, title sd, of the 
provisional Constitution, and by that of the republic of Colombia as 
soon as it can obtain the approbation of the Senate, in virtue of the 
resolution by the law of Congress, of 18th October, 1821.; .and in case, 
by any accident, it cannot assemble, it shall be .. ratified in the next 
Congress, agreeably to the provision.of the.Constitution of the 
repuhlic, in article 55,.section.18 .. The .. ratifications shall be 
exchanged without delay., and in the . period which . t.he . dis ta nee .. that 
separates both governments permits. 
In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have sign~d 
these pr.esents, and sealed them with the seals of the states which 
they represent. 
Done in the City of Santiago de Chile, on the twenty-first day of 
the month of October, in the year of Grace one thousand eight hundred 
and twenty-two, twelfth of the independence of Colombia, thirteenth 
of the liberty of Chile, and fifth of its independence. 
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